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INTRODUCTION
Out of the numerous, yet various ways in which H. Richard Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture
has been described throughout the years, Martin Marty recently summarized it as “a classic.”1 By
itself, such a statement is often tossed around haphazardly by many today, so the comment
certainly does not reveal much about the influence of Niebuhr’s work. Then again, Marty
elaborates, indicating that the book has been so significant that it cannot simply be left as “a
classic,” but that it is “a work of genius,” so much that “a later culture must take [it] into account
once that work has had a chance to leave its marks.”2
John Stackhouse similarly stated that “perhaps no other book” outside of Christ and
Culture “has dominated an entire theological conversation for so long”3 within the American
context. As of 2013, more than five decades have passed since the original publication date of
the book, and Christ and Culture continues to generate discussion among Christians. It should
come as no surprise then that someone such as Marty is thereby incredibly accurate with his
assessment.
Marty and Stackhouse are certainly not alone with their evaluations. In fact, Christ and
Culture has left such an imprint within the mold of American Christianity that Craig Carter can

1

Martin Marty, foreword to Christ and Culture, by H. Richard Niebuhr (San Francisco: Harper, 2001), xiii.

2

Ibid.

3 John Gordon Stackhouse, “In the world, but . . .: Richard Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture is 50 years old—and
still has something wise to say to evangelicals,” Christianity Today, April 22, 2002, 80.
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claim that “[t]he concepts set forth in Niebuhr’s book have become part of the way that many
people think about the relationship of Christ and culture today.”4
To be sure, at least a few scholars have recently published monographs that have evaluated
Niebuhr’s taxonomy afresh which seems to suggest that Niebuhr’s legacy continues to thrive.5
These works include critiques and even modifications pertaining to the overall thesis of Christ
and Culture. For contemporary readers of Niebuhr’s classic, many of these are attempts to
provide insight and commentary into relating Christ and Culture to a world that has undergone
drastic changes within the past five decades since its initial release. Some of these authors are
supportive of Niebuhr, claiming that he is still relevant within the context of theological
conversations in the Western world, whereas others are not so supportive of him and seek to
dismiss his contemporary relevancy.
One of the critical responses to Christ and Culture claims that the book has contributed to a
“guilt-by-association” historiography due to Niebuhr’s popularity. According to Craig Carter’s
perspective, this means that nearly any contemporary individual or group associated with the
historical figures or movements found within the book become de facto linked with the
corresponding typology. As Carter argues in Rethinking Christ and Culture, one such example of
this “guilt-by-association” historiography is that any individual or group that has advocated for
some form of pacifism becomes automatically identified with Tertullian and Leo Tolstoy in the

Craig A. Carter, Rethinking Christ and Culture: A Post-Christendom Perspective (Grand Rapids: Brazos,
2007), 13.
4

For two of the most recent publications that responded to Christ and Culture, see Craig A. Carter, Rethinking
Christ and Culture: A Post-Christendom Perspective (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2007); and D. A. Carson, Christ and
Culture Revisited (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008). Charles Scriven also contributed to this conversation in the
1980s with a lengthy response to Niebuhr. See Charles Scriven, The Transformation of Culture: Christian Social
Ethics After H. Richard Niebuhr (Scottsdale: Herald, 1988).
5
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“Christ against culture” type, regardless of the views that the individual or group has about other
matters including Christology.6
Carter and others emphasize this in order to accentuate their critique that such individuals
and movements like Tertullian and Tolstoy have unfairly gone down in history as those who
Niebuhr labels as the “radicals” who have been allegedly “against culture.” As a result, whatever
these individuals or movements actually contributed to culture is either overlooked or
marginalized.
Other than Carter, John Howard Yoder was one of the first who critically evaluated Christ
and Culture.7 Consequently, Yoder opened up an entirely new hole within the discussion of the
relationship between Christ and culture as he attempted to expose several problems with the
book. To be sure, it was not until years later when individuals such as Stanley Hauerwas and
Craig Carter continued many of these critiques that Yoder originally presented. They have since
contributed to the Christ and culture discussion by heightening accusations against Niebuhr by
claiming that he presupposed the notion of “Christendom” within his presentation of culture. For
these critics, and many others like them, Christendom takes on its own definition, as they use it
in a pejorative sense.
Yoder and the critics of Niebuhr, however, were certainly not the first to critique
Christendom. From as far back as the middle of the nineteenth century, Soren Kierkegaard
launched a tirade of attacks upon the Danish church that predominantly centered upon what he
perceived to be the unholy and unruly interconnectedness between the church and the

6

Carter, Rethinking Christ and Culture, 121.

7 John Howard Yoder, “How H. Richard Niebuhr Reasoned: A Critique of Christ and Culture,” in Authentic
Transformation: A New Vision of Christ and Culture, ed. Glen H. Stassen, Diane M. Yeager, and John Howard
Yoder (Nashville: Abingdon, 1996), 31–89.
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government. Kierkegaard reacted so strongly to the situation that he declared that the Danish
church was “apostate” and far removed from what he repeatedly described as “New Testament
Christianity.” These attacks have been posthumously published within Attack upon Christendom.
Less than a century after Kierkegaard’s formal attacks, Dietrich Bonhoeffer also began to
call attention to the tensions that he noticed occurring between the church and the newly formed
Nazi government. Like Kierkegaard, Bonhoeffer was often alone with his criticisms of what he
perceived to be a corrupt system growing increasingly stronger around him. And also like
Kierkegaard, Bonhoeffer was one of the few individuals of his time who responded to his
cultural situation with sharp criticism while seeking to apply the Christian faith within such a
social context. Bonhoeffer’s keen sense of awareness into the cultural situation led him to raise
concerns about how Christians should interact with culture in his 1937 masterpiece, Discipleship.
In light of the relatively recent critiques of Christ and Culture, I would like to examine
another text by a rough contemporary of Niebuhr’s: Bonhoeffer’s Discipleship. In the book,
Bonhoeffer is dealing with similar themes and problems as Niebuhr wrestled with years later, yet
Bonhoeffer has an entirely different interpretation and outcome than Niebuhr. Why is this the
case? What was occurring in Bonhoeffer’s social context and what influenced him that
contributed to his argument? To help answer this question I will focus upon three areas that
recent criticisms of Christ and Culture have highlighted: (1) the definition of culture, (2) the
assessment of Christendom, and (3) the operating Christology. In all three of these areas, I hope
to explore more deeply the themes of both how and why Bonhoeffer comes to the conclusions
that he does in Discipleship. What makes his cultural critiques so unique? Does he offer a
perspective that Niebuhr did not? Such an examination will not only give us a better
understanding of Bonhoeffer in this period of his theological development but it will also give us

4

the opportunity to look at another text besides Niebuhr’s that deals with the “enduring problem”
of Christ and culture.
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CHAPTER ONE
CONTEMPORARY CRITICISM OF NIEBUHR
As previously indicated in the introduction, despite the favorable reception that H. Richard
Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture has received throughout the years, the book is not without its
critics. Specifically, there seems to be three main areas where the book has undergone critique in
the past. First, the most frequent of these critiques pertain to Niebuhr’s usage and description of
culture. Critics claim that major problems not only originate at this point, but that his
perspectives on culture shape other important views found throughout Christ and Culture.
Subsequently, critics claim that this applies the most towards his operating Christology and at
least a few critics have also accused Niebuhr of presupposing the normality of Christendom
within his presentation of culture.
Within this chapter, I shall investigate each of these three areas of contemporary criticism
of Christ and Culture. As a result, this will open a door to help us to better understand that
Dietrich Bonhoeffer in Discipleship was wrestling with very similar themes as Niebuhr. Yet
unlike Niebuhr, however, Bonhoeffer had an entirely different interpretation and outcome of his
cultural situation. As I will demonstrate, this is because Bonhoeffer wrote Discipleship in
response to his own cultural situation as he was attempting to prescribe how Christians should
respond in their particular culture within Germany. Niebuhr’s goal was different as he selfadmittedly attempted to describe how Christians have responded to the Christ and culture
situation throughout history.

6

In other words, I shall look into the critical response to Niebuhr on these three major topics
so that we will better understand both how and why Bonhoeffer was so unique with Discipleship.
Contemporary critics of Niebuhr highlight alleged problems with his work that Bonhoeffer had
already taken into consideration years before Christ and Culture surfaced. In this sense,
Discipleship has an entirely different outcome than Christ and Culture in its ability to answer the
enduring problem that Niebuhr articulated in the 1950s.
While there is a vast amount of secondary sources available pertaining to critiques of
Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture,8 I will focus the majority of my attention on John Howard Yoder’s
response to Niebuhr titled, “How H. Richard Niebuhr Reasoned: A Critique of Christ and
Culture.”9 My reason for this is not arbitrary because the essay is one of the most detailed
responses available. In fact, Stephen Wilson claims that Yoder’s essay is “one of the most
significant though neglected analyses” that responds to Christ and Culture.10 Other than Yoder’s
contribution, additional resources will also be consulted that interact with Yoder’s critique of
Niebuhr on these three key issues.
With that said, Yoder’s article was not a hasty or a flippant response to Niebuhr, as Yoder
began his formal critiques during a series of lectures in 1958 and expanded them throughout the
years. These lectures were eventually published into a seventy-two page essay in 1996 within
Authentic Transformation: A New Vision of Christ and Culture. Yoder’s essay was a
The two most recent books that directly engage with Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture are Craig Carter,
Rethinking Christ and Culture: A Post-Christendom Perspective (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2006); D. A. Carson,
Christ and Culture Revisited (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 2008); and Charles Scriven, The Transformation of Culture:
Christian Social Ethics After H. Richard Niebuhr (Scottsdale: Herald, 1988).
8

9 John Howard Yoder, “How H. Richard Niebuhr Reasoned: A Critique of Christ and Culture,” in Authentic
Transformation: A New Vision of Christ and Culture, ed. Glen H. Stassen, Diane M. Yeager, and John Howard
Yoder (Nashville: Abingdon, 1996), 31–89.
10 Stephen Wilson, “Christ and Cult(ure): Some Preliminary Reflections on Liturgy and Life,” Liturgical
Ministry, no. 12 (September 1, 2003): 184.
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comprehensive project that took him years to develop, as he devoted much of his time towards it
throughout the decades.11
As much effort as Yoder devoted to his response, however, Niebuhr himself did not
produce his book on a whim, either. In fact, at least a few of the main themes of Christ and
Culture date back to as early as 1949 when he delivered a series of lectures at Austin
Presbyterian Theological Seminary.12 Just as Yoder was influenced by Niebuhr for the bulk of
his essay, Niebuhr also had Ernst Troeltsch’s The Social Teachings of the Christian Church as “a
key influence” on him.13 This suggests that Yoder and Niebuhr were not writing in a vacuum but
that they had key conversational partners for their projects. The relationship between these two
individuals is significant because Bonhoeffer also had Kierkegaard as a conversation partner for
Discipleship. In the next chapter, I will show why this is significant, but for now, the discussion
between Yoder and Niebuhr will take precedence.
Among all the critical responses of Christ and Culture, Yoder’s essay is perhaps one of the
most widely discussed within academic circles. In Resident Aliens, Hauerwas shares Yoder’s
critiques when he claims:
We have come to believe that few books have been a greater hindrance to an accurate
assessment of our situation than Christ and Culture. Niebuhr rightly saw that our
politics determines our theology. He was right that Christians cannot reject “culture.”
But his call to Christians to accept “culture” . . . and politics in the name of the unity
of God’s creating and redeeming activity had the effect of endorsing a
Constantianism social strategy. “Culture” became a blanket term to underwrite

Mark Nation, John Howard Yoder: Mennonite Patience, Evangelical Witness, Catholic Convictions (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 134.
11

12

H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York: Harper & Row, 1951), ix.

13

Ibid., xi-xii.
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Christian involvement with the world without providing any discriminating modes for
determining how Christians should see the good or the bad in “culture.”14
Hauerwas also accuses Christ and Culture of not offering “an objective description” of
certain individuals or movements throughout the history of Christianity. Instead, according to
Hauerwas, the book had a subtle, yet prescriptive bent to it.15 According to the critics, the
absence of any kind of criticisms pertaining to the transformative type within Christ and Culture
allegedly “set up”16 Niebuhr’s argument in order to make it appear the most worthy of the five.17
As a result, critics argue that Niebuhr’s definite preference has marginalized the other types,
especially that one which he describes as “Christ against culture.” Hauerwas even claims that
Niebuhr crafted his book in such a way that it would resonate the most with modern, Western
readers who, in his estimation, are predisposed to embracing the notion of progress.18
Not everyone, however, has been this critical of Niebuhr. In fact, James Gustafson, a
former student of Niebuhr, has come to his defense. In the preface of the most recent edition of
Christ and Culture, Gustafson responds to some of the criticisms made by individuals like Yoder
and Hauerwas by claiming that not only was Niebuhr’s project incredibly unique, but that it also
accurately represented history. Niebuhr’s critics have simply misread him, according to
Gustafson, and have completely blown Christ and Culture out of proportion. Among these

14

Stanley Hauerwas, Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1990), 40.

15

Ibid., 39.

Yoder and Hauerwas both argue that Niebuhr “set up” his argument. See Hauerwas, Resident Aliens, 40; and
Yoder, “How H. Richard Niebuhr Reasoned,” 52.
16

This point is repeatedly made in secondary literature about Niebuhr showing favoritism towards the
transformative type in Christ and Culture. It is interesting to note, however, that Diane Yeager recalls a conversation
that she had with Niebuhr’s son, Richard R. Niebuhr, who reportedly told Yeager that he was “skeptical” that his
father did “prefer” the transformative type. See Diane M. Yeager, “The View from Somewhere: The Meaning of
Method in Christ and Culture,” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 23, no. 1 (March 1, 2003): 101–120.
17

18

Hauerwas, Resident Aliens, 40–41.
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counter-criticisms from Gustafson is one specifically directed towards Yoder. Gustafson writes
of him:
John Howard Yoder . . . for years circulated versions of a critique of Christ and
Culture which is laced with more ad hominem arguments and fortified with more
gratuitous footnotes than anything I ever read by scholars in the field of Christian
ethics. This paper has been published, but I have not had access to it—perhaps
fortunately.19
Yoder and Hauerwas apparently struck a nerve with Gustafson. Even though Yoder and
Hauerwas claim that Christ and Culture implicitly trains its readers “what to think”20 under the
guise of objectivity, Gustafson, however, strongly rejects that Niebuhr had his own hidden
agenda. Rather, Gustafson argues that individuals such as Yoder and Hauerwas have simply
misread Christ and Culture. Yoder and Hauerwas seem to suggest that they would not have as
many problems with the book if Niebuhr simply admitted that he had a certain goal with it. On
the other hand, if he was as straightforward with his agenda as someone like Bonhoeffer was in
Discipleship about writing in response towards the cultural situation of his day, perhaps critics
would not have been so vocal with their critiques of the book. As I will demonstrate later,
Bonhoeffer makes it clear to his readers from the onset of Discipleship what his goals entail.
Returning to Gustafson, he also denies that Niebuhr sought to compel his readers towards
embracing one of the particular types against the others. At the same time, however, Gustafson
acknowledges that the transformative type is “treated less critically and more sympathetically”
than the other four, and that such treatment “reflects Niebuhr’s judgment that it is the most
adequate.”21 Gustafson elaborates by claiming that “even a preference for the conversionist
19

James Gustafson, preface to the expanded edition of Christ and Culture (New York: HarperCollins, 2001),

20

See Yoder, “How H. Richard Niebuhr Reasoned,” 52; and Hauerwas, Resident Aliens, 40–41.

21

Gustafson, Christ and Culture, xxviii.

xxiii.
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theme does not vitiate the disinterested fairness with which the other four types are developed.”22
In other words, Gustafson argues that Niebuhr attempted to be as fair as possible with his
presentation, and that he was successful with it.
Yoder was certainly aware of Niebuhr’s attempts of engaging in epistemic humility, but at
the same time, Yoder interprets the situation quite differently than Gustafson. “In making
‘humility’ the prime virtue,” writes Yoder, Niebuhr “rejects as naive any conviction that truth
can be clearly known and can lay upon us definite claims which we must unequivocally obey.”23
To some, this may be an indication that Gustafson and Yoder are simply looking at the book
from different angles.
These interpretative differences seem to reflect something about how theological
commitments and hermeneutics shape the discussion of relating Christ to culture.24 Diane Yeager
comments on this theme, claiming that “for Yoder there is one Christ and one gospel and one
witness, carried into and spoken of and lived out in diverse cultural milieus.” Conversely, Yeager
labels Niebuhr as the “Christian pluralist” who she suspects would reject Yoder’s exclusivism.25
Yeager argues that Niebuhr should be understood as a “Christian pluralist” who is “respecting of
Christian diversity” and “attempts, on theological grounds, to acknowledge and even celebrate
the distance between his own view and that of Yoder.”26 Yeager’s argument seems to indicate

22

Ibid., xxix.

23

Yoder, “How H. Richard Niebuhr Reasoned,” 52.

24 Dennis P. McCann, “Hermeneutics and Ethics: The Example of Reinhold Niebuhr,” The Journal of
Religious Ethics 8, no. 1 (Spring 1980): 47–48. For a thorough presentation of Yoder’s overall theology, along with
his Barthian influences, see Craig Carter, The Politics of the Cross (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2001), 61–90.

Koontz describes Yoder’s perspective as more “exclusive” than Niebuhr. See Gayle Gerber Koontz,
“Confessional Theology in a Pluralistic Context: A Study of the Theological Ethics of H. Richard Niebuhr and John
H. Yoder,” Mennonite Quarterly Review 61, no. 4 (October 1, 1987): 417.
25

Yeager, “The View from Somewhere,” 119. Koontz offers a similar interpretation of Niebuhr’s theology in
that one of the implications his alleged theocentrism is that “Christians cannot claim exclusive knowledge of God or
(continued next page)
26
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that theological presuppositions significantly shape how one relates Christ to culture.
Hermeneutics is certainly important for the Christ and culture discussion. In the next
chapter, I will show how Bonhoeffer’s hermeneutical approach to the Sermon on the Mount in
particular drives the way in which he perceives of the relationship between Christ and his
particular cultural situation.
For now, we should summarize and stress that Yoder began a critique against Niebuhr’s
Christ and Culture years ago that has influenced other critics of Niebuhr. Despite all of Yoder’s
critiques, however, the one that is regularly reintroduced in criticisms of Niebuhr is that Christ
and Culture has firmly established what Yoder identifies as a “definite preference” for the
transformative model within American Christianity.27 In his own words, Yoder attempts to justify
his claim by appealing to Paul Ramsey who indicates:
When Richard Niebuhr’s book first appeared almost everyone in American
Christendom rushed to locate himself among the “transformists”: naturalists, process
theologians, personalists, idealists, Lutherans and Anglicans who were sometimes
Thomists, as well as those you would have expected . . . so universal was the
conviction that . . . the Christian always joins in the transformation of the world
whenever this is proposed.28
Hauerwas adds his own perspective to this issue by claiming that the assumption that the
transformative model is superior to the others has had “the effect of endorsing a Constantinian

assume that their ethical judgments are universal absolutes” which seems to provoke Yoder’s Christocentric focus
on Christian responsibility. As such, Koontz describes the tension between the two men well when she writes,
“Yoder sees Christians far too quickly relativizing the authority of Christ and of the Scriptures in relation to other
more provincial, self-serving or secular authorities, while Niebuhr warns against the opposite problems—biblicism
and the self-righteous ethics of a ‘redeemed community.’” Koontz describes additional tensions between the two
individuals which may be a result of their overall theological commitments and presuppositions, as alluded to above.
See Koontz, “Confessional Theology in a Pluralistic Context,” 413–418.
27 Yoder, “How H. Richard Niebuhr Reasoned,” 41, 53. See also Hauerwas, Resident Aliens, 39–41; Craig
Carter, Rethinking Christ and Culture (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2006), 52; and D. A. Carson, Christ and Culture
Revisited (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 28–29, 38–39.
28

Yoder, “How H. Richard Niebuhr Reasoned,” 53.
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social strategy.”29 Consequently, readers of Christ and Culture have assumed the normalcy of
“Constantianism” or “Christendom” which Hauerwas specifically claims has led to the decay of
the Christian faith in the Western world.
According to the critical view, therefore, Niebuhr’s alleged preference of how Christians
should transform what he describes as culture has contributed to the transformative type as being
the “definite preference” as Ramsey indicates. Besides this, should one suspect that Niebuhr’s
influence has also shaped the ways that writings pertaining to the Christ and culture debate are
read? In other words, could it be that Niebuhr’s dominating influence has led to the neglect of
other works like Discipleship that attempt to prioritize the significance of a separated church
community? In the next chapter, I will argue that this is one of Bonhoeffer’s priorities in
Discipleship that is key to understanding how he understands the relationship between Christ and
his cultural setting.
For now, however, the three themes—Niebuhr’s usage and description of culture, his
Christology, and his alleged presupposition of Constantianism or Christendom within his
concept of culture—will be expanded upon in these next sections. In each section, the goal is to
not only lay out Niebuhr’s own perspective towards these issues, but to also show how critics
have responded to each respective topic. By doing so, I will highlight how Bonhoeffer
approached the Christ and culture question in Discipleship, where he went with those themes in
his context, and where Niebuhr supposedly did not.

29

Hauerwas, Resident Aliens, 40.
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Niebuhr and Culture in Christ and Culture
One of the ongoing critiques that has been directed towards Christ and Culture throughout
the years has been in regard to Niebuhr’s usage and description of culture. Conclusions reached
about this topic will inevitably determine how one responds to Niebuhr’s Christology and also to
his alleged Christendom presupposition. Stated differently, critics claim that his concept of
culture is not only faulty but that hidden within it is an alleged Christendom presupposition. In
addition, critics also argue that Niebuhr’s concept of culture informs his Christological views.
From the critical standpoint, they would argue that more is at stake with Niebuhr’s presentation
of culture than one might expect on the surface.
To be sure, Niebuhr elaborates on culture along with its nuances in the book. His ultimate
goal, however, is to expound upon culture in regard to his primary task which he poses as a
question. Niebuhr asks the reader, “What do we mean in our use of this word when we say that
the Christian church enduringly struggles with the problem of Christ and culture?”30 That which
follows in the subsequent pages of Christ and Culture is his answer to this perennial question.
In his essay, Yoder devotes significant space to this theme, as much of what he has to say
about Niebuhr’s usage of culture reverberates into other areas of critique, especially in regard to
Niebuhr’s Christology. Some have even argued that one of the central themes in Yoder’s essay is
his critique of Niebuhr for allegedly assuming the normalcy of Christendom or Constantianism
within his definition of culture.31
Why, then, is Yoder so greatly dissatisfied with Niebuhr’s presentation of culture? From
Yoder’s perspective, there is much at stake with Niebuhr’s terminology. As I will argue in the
30

Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, 30.

31

Timothy Tennent, Invitation to World Missions (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2010), 164.
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next chapter, Niebuhr is simply not as clear as Bonhoeffer is in Discipleship with how he
addresses culture. While Yoder argues in his essay that Christ and Culture has not only
developed a distinctive reputation as being “the common coin of contemporary thought” in
regard to its themes pertaining to the relationship between Christ and culture, he also claims that
the arguments made throughout the book “have been borrowed consciously by many,
unconsciously by many more.”32 To this extent, it is a classic. Yet, within any book hailed as a
classic, Yoder maintains that there are bound to be “unspoken axioms” and “tacit biases”
throughout it. Christ and Culture should not be regarded as an exception to such concerns, Yoder
claims, so the starting point of his essay begins with an examination into these “unspoken
axioms” and “tacit biases.” Among these subtle presuppositions are the ways that Yoder argues
how Niebuhr specifically uses the word culture in his book. In order to support his claims, Yoder
directs his attention to the first chapter of Christ and Culture where Niebuhr sets out to define his
major term of culture.
In the chapter, Niebuhr himself acknowledges that he is writing as a theologian, so part of
his attempt to provide a working definition of culture is not to venture into the intricacies and
nuances of what it could entail if it were originating from a strictly anthropological perspective.
Niebuhr readily admits this point, yet Yoder claims that his insistence to avoid anthropology is
misleading,33 as he argues that Niebuhr’s first attempt to describe culture is essentially
anthropocentric.34

32

Yoder, “How H. Richard Niebuhr Reasoned,” 31.

Kreider maintains that Niebuhr still used “anthropological definitions” despite his stated concerns to avoid
interaction with the discipline. This perspective seems to harmonize with Yoder’s overall position. See Alan
Kreider, “Christ, Culture, and Truth-Telling,” Conrad Grebel Review 15, no. 3 (September 1, 1997): 210.
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Other critics echo Yoder’s critique about Niebuhr’s alleged anthropocentric foundation.35
Carter also reflects the concerns of this critique, claiming that Niebuhr’s definition of culture is
“defined in a humanistic way” as he points to Niebuhr’s own words where he writes that it is
“man” who determines what is good, since “man begins with himself as the chief value and the
source of all other values.”36 Within such an allegedly “humanistic” description of culture, Carter
argues that what is not clear within it is how or even if Niebuhr’s concept of culture has been
impacted by the fall.37
Niebuhr seeks to move past this allegedly “humanistic” orientation by narrowing down
culture in a way that is more precise and without ambiguity. One of these occurrences is when
Niebuhr distances his presentation of culture from its casual connotations that often take it to be
synonymous or interchangeable with society.38 Yet culture, understood from this perspective, is
still too broad for Niebuhr. Not long after he offers this point of clarification, Niebuhr expounds
upon culture even further, indicating that “what we have in view when we deal with Christ and
culture is that total process of human activity” where “culture is the ‘artificial, secondary
environment’ which man superimposes on the natural.”39
For Niebuhr, this includes “language, habits, ideas, beliefs, customs, social organization,
inherited artifacts, technical processes, and values.”40 Yoder’s interpretation of these remarks is
Niebuhr and Christian Pacifism,” Mennonite Quarterly Review 29, no. 2 (April 1955): 102.
Stanley Hauerwas, “On Keeping Theological Ethics Theological,” in The Hauerwas Reader, ed. John
Berkman and Michael Cartwright (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 60.
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that for Niebuhr, culture “can mean everything people do” and that it involves “every realm of
human behavior.”41 From Yoder’s perspective, this definition is simply too broad and confusing,
as it would include areas of life where “minority groups” such as the Mennonites have flourished
at during the years. But Yoder finds a problem with the way Niebuhr has already constructed his
argument, since the inclusion of the Mennonites in the “against” type would suggest that they are
also “against” cultural activities. In contrast, Yoder argues that the Mennonites have been quite
productive with cultural activities, including areas of agriculture, family, schools and literature.
Beyond these descriptions, Niebuhr also claims that culture is a “social heritage” which the
writers of the New Testament “had in mind” when they wrote about “the world.”42 Niebuhr
reiterates this last point, claiming that “the world” is “what we mean when we speak of culture.”
In other words, Niebuhr indicates that culture and the world should be regarded as
synonymous terms within his project. “The world,” according to Niebuhr, also “appears as a
realm under the power of evil; it is the region of darkness . . . it is characterized by the
prevalence in it of lies, hatred, and murder . . . it is a secular society.”43
From the critical perspective, this is a decisive point where critics begin to raise serious
allegations of Niebuhr’s motives for writing Christ and Culture. Critics claim that if culture and
the world should be regarded as synonymous as Niebuhr allegedly presents them to be, then the
implication is that culture is not only fallen but that it has been, that it is, and that it will always
be in conflict with Christ, since Christ himself is not regarded among those who are fallen from
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Niebuhr’s perspective.44 But, as Yoder maintains, Niebuhr’s definition seems to arbitrarily
change later when minority groups are addressed.45
Yoder claims that this change comes suddenly and without warning. According to Yoder,
Niebuhr turns from his allegedly broad definition of culture to a narrow one that targets
Mennonite groups for being “against culture” since they promote pacifism, a view that is not
represented by the majority population in Christian history. For Yoder, this suggests that Niebuhr
has shifted his broad and inclusive definition of culture to now mean “the majority position of a
given society.”46 Yoder calls this “a new definition” and one that comes “without explanation
anywhere else in the text.”47
Yoder further claims that the implication of this shift in terminology works to Niebuhr’s
advantage to the extent that if an individual or a movement is critical of anything that has been
embraced by the majority population of a culture, then they are labeled as being against all of it.
With this argument, Yoder strongly claims that Niebuhr had an all-or-nothing approach to
culture.
At least one critic disagrees with Yoder at this point. According to D. A. Carson, the
apparent contradiction can be resolved. Carson’s attempted solution to the problem is that one
must assume that what Niebuhr had in mind was that when culture is compared with the world,
what Niebuhr is actually implying is that culture should be understood as “something like
‘culture-devoid-of-Christ.’”48
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Even though Yoder wrote his critique of Christ and Culture years before Carson’s
surfaced, Yoder’s essay does not seem to make room for such an interpretation. There is a
significant reason why Yoder would have been reluctant to share in Carson’s interpretation if he
had the chance to assess it.
The reason is that Yoder himself claims that Niebuhr’s presentation of the world is simply
incorrect, as Yoder writes that “the New Testament” does not indicate that the world means “all
of culture,” but instead, “it means culture as self-glorifying or culture as autonomous and
rebellious and oppressive, opposed to authentic human flourishing.”49 In other words, Yoder is
not as generous to Niebuhr as Carson seems to be by assuming that Niebuhr may have intended
“something like ‘culture-devoid-of-Christ.’”50 Instead, Yoder holds Niebuhr accountable for his
precise wording.
As a result of these two perspectives, it seems to be that critics are divided about whatever
Niebuhr meant by his usage of the world. As such, it remains a debatable topic among scholars.
What seems to come across, however, is that it connects in some way to how Niebuhr understood
culture. As ambiguous as it may be at times, Bonhoeffer also used the phrase the world quite
often in Discipleship, and as I will demonstrate in the next chapter, the ways that he spoke of this
phrase is critical to understanding how he perceived the relationship between Christ and his own
cultural setting.
Yoder’s dispute with Niebuhr about terminology remained a problem. It is an especially
significant problem for Yoder because he emphasizes that even though Niebuhr is inconsistent
with his terms, he is still more than willing to take the time to expose individuals like Tertullian
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and Tolstoy who were acting “inconsistent”51 in their criticisms of culture. In order to
demonstrate this claim, Yoder indicates that regardless of the critiques that someone like
Tertullian made of politics, military service, business practices, philosophy and the arts,
Tertullian’s foundational problem for Niebuhr was that he was “inconsistent” in regard to his
perspective about culture. What this means, according to Yoder, is that “should anyone [such as
Tertullian] not have the same attitude toward every part of culture, this is itself evidence of
inconsistency.”52 Yoder cites Niebuhr at this point where he describes Tertullian as one who
could “not in fact emancipate himself and the church from reliance on and participation in
culture.”53
Compared to Niebuhr’s interpretation of Tertullian, Yoder argues that Tertullian’s
knowledge of Latin, along with his affirmations about the value of human intelligence, and even
some of his praises of Roman society were overlooked or ignored by Niebuhr simply because he
did not denounce or affirm all of the culture around him.54 According to Yoder, if someone like
Tertullian refuses to participate in war, or repudiates the practice of making oaths to Caesar,
while at the same time is fluent in Latin and appreciates music, then he is being inconsistent in
Niebuhr’s estimation.55 So, culture for Niebuhr, at least from Yoder’s interpretation, is
monolithic, and for this supposedly monolithic aspect of Niebuhr’s representation of culture to
work, Yoder claims:
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For this kind of inconsistency to be a logical or moral flaw, as it is reported to be,
“culture” must be assumed to be a single bloc, which an honest and consistent
approach would either reject entirely or accept without qualification; you must either
withdraw from it all, transform it all, or keep it all in paradox.56
In order for someone like Tertullian to escape being denounced as someone who was
“against culture,” Yoder argues that he would have had to affirm everything about the culture
around him without having any moral discrimination.57 Carter argues from this perspective, too,
adding that anyone who ever embraced pacifism would be automatically dismissed by Niebuhr
as being “against culture.”58 Critics wonder if Niebuhr provided allowance for someone to have a
favorable attitude of creation and of culture even though such an individual may not consider
war to be a morally justifiable option.
To be sure, critics interact with Niebuhr’s own conditions that there are times when
“movement of withdrawal and renunciation is a necessary element in every Christian life,”59 and
that it is to be “followed by an equally necessary movement of responsible engagement in
cultural tasks.”60 According to Carter, these are Niebuhr’s indications that it is “impossible” to
“rely solely on Jesus Christ to the exclusion of culture.”61 As a result of the way Niebuhr related
culture and the world, Carter not only claims that Niebuhr’s Christ points people away from this
world to God, but that there is something else even more problematic:
[Niebuhr] allows no choice between a godly culture and an ungodly one, no possible
contrast between a Christian community (e.g., a monastic one) and a pagan society
(e.g., the Roman Empire). Why not? His definitions simply exclude such possibilities.
56

Yoder, “How H. Richard Niebuhr Reasoned,” 54–55.

57

Ibid.

58

Carter, Rethinking Christ and Culture, 121.

59

Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, 68.

60

Ibid.

61

Carter, Rethinking Christ and Culture, 42.

21

For him, to move closer to Christ (and God) is by definition to move away from
culture. But this conclusion is not deduced from historical data; it is contained in the
definitions, which function as a premise.62
Carter later seems to have extended the logic of this argument to claim that Niebuhr’s
interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount entails that the commands in it are “unrealistic given
the reality of the world.”63 In other words, Carter thinks that this is yet another occurrence where
Niebuhr frames his argument, but this time it precludes Christians from actually abiding by the
literal precepts in the Sermon on the Mount.
As for Yoder, he attempts to rescue Tertullian and others from the apparent trap of being
“radicals” by claiming that “every morally accountable affirmation of culture discriminates.”64
Tertullian is just one of these figures who engaged in moral discrimination, according to Yoder.
To this extent, Yoder argues that Niebuhr does not provide any assistance in Christ and Culture
with offering categories of discernment with the result that it lacks cultural specificity.65 Christ
and Culture is not a very helpful resource at all according to Niebuhr’s critics. It simply lacks
any way for Christians to sort through moral issues in their own cultural settings while
attempting to be faithful to God.
In fact, this is one of Yoder’s major grievances. Yoder claims that his discriminating
principle is not only “the cultural stance of the Christian church according to the New
Testament,”66 but that it offers a better way to think about relating Christ to culture in a way that
Niebuhr’s book simply did not. According to Yoder, such a perspective as his does not explicitly
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present a strategy to apply “uniformly, either accepting or rejecting (or paradoxing or
transforming) [to] all of ‘culture’ in the same way”67 like Niebuhr’s strategy. Yoder’s comments
imply that there will always be some sort of a paradoxical tension between Christ and culture.
Yoder explains in further detail:
Where there is opposition between the claims of Christ and the claim to autonomy of
a given cultural value—i.e., when it claims our ultimate loyalty, making itself an
idol—then the Christian church and the individual disciple must reject that claim . . .
it is important that Jesus does say this not only about wealth or war but also about the
family. At these points . . . the New Testament-oriented Christian will follow Christ
in taking the kind of position which Niebuhr calls “radical” and “sectarian.” But by
no means need it be assumed that this choice is always necessary. Even when it is,
those who take that position are not leaving the world, but influencing it . . . for when
the New Testament speaks of “world” it precisely does not mean, as Niebuhr says, all
of culture. It means rather culture as self-glorifying or culture as autonomous and
rebellious and oppressive, opposed to authentic human flourishing.68
For Yoder, Niebuhr was not only wrong with his presentation of culture but also with his
biblical exegesis of the world. Could it be that something—perhaps Niebuhr’s own culture—
influenced his exegesis of these themes without his direct awareness? Similarly, how might one,
such as Bonhoeffer, who lived in an entirely different culture as Niebuhr, describe this important
terminology? As we will see, Bonhoeffer not only uses the world frequently, but he also relates it
to his own cultural situation with remarkable precision.
As for Yoder, he simply juxtaposes the church and culture in a way that Niebuhr does not
seem to do in his book. Yoder’s special emphasis on these words leads him to feel no shame
about admitting that Christians should be counter-cultural, and that they should even be radical at
times.
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From Yoder’s perspective, the juxtaposition between the church and culture is necessary
because he understands the community of disciples within the New Testament to be
paradigmatic of a “subculture.”69 For Yoder, this means that the church is an alternative
community that is separated from the surrounding culture at large. Since this sort of subculture
takes its cues primarily through the witness of Jesus Christ, Yoder argues that its beliefs and
practices will necessarily come into conflict with the majority of culture at times. As a result of
promoting an ecclesiology that distinguishes between the church and the culture at large, Yoder
ultimately distances himself from Niebuhr’s alleged pluralism when he argues that:
Some elements of culture the church categorically rejects (pornography, tyranny,
cultic idolatry). Other dimensions of culture it accepts within clear limits (economic
production, commerce, the graphic arts, paying taxes for peacetime civil
government.). To still other dimensions of culture Christian faith gives a new
motivation and coherence (agriculture, family life, literacy, conflict resolution,
empowerment.). Still others it strips of their claims to possess autonomous truth and
value, and uses them as vehicles of communication . . . Still other forms of culture are
created by the Christian churches (hospitals, service for the poor, generalized
education, egalitarianism, abolitionism, feminism) . . . Our need, one with which
Niebuhr gives us no assistance, is precisely to find categories of discernment by
virtue of which the several value dimensions of cultural creativeness can be
distinguished.70
These comments seem to indicate that there are simply aspects of culture for Yoder that
Christians should never support and never have to engage. Yet Christians can be effective in
culture. Yoder elaborates upon this in his final comments of his essay, and even offers
correctives to Niebuhr by claiming:
Everything we call “culture” is both in some way created and creative and positive,
and in other ways rebellious and oppressive. This is not a fifty/fifty mix, but a far
more complex dialectical challenge, whereby we are called to exercise discernment.
John Howard Yoder, The Priestly Kingdom: Social Ethics as Gospel (South Bend: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1984), 93. See also John Howard Yoder, For the Nations (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 15–36, 37–50.
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We should precisely not try to be consistent by affirming all, rejecting all, or
paradoxing all, as the Niebuhr outline assumes would be consistent, but to be
concretely discriminating, after rejecting any notion of an overall escape. Some
aspects of human activity are thus less redeemable than others. In particular settings,
Christians have rejected the theater; in others theater has served the gospel and the
church. This is not inconsistency but concrete situational discernment. We need to
ask not either/or questions but How? and When? questions.71
One of the areas of emphasis for Yoder in these comments is the necessity for “situational
discernment.” As far as the Christ and culture debate is concerned, Yoder’s discussion about the
proper role of the church is a significant point that is also found in Discipleship as Bonhoeffer
has a similar way of understanding how the church should relate to the culture around it. Yet for
Bonhoeffer in Discipleship, as I will argue, he is not simply arguing how the church should
function within societies in theory, but instead, Bonhoeffer is arguing how the Confessing
Church should operate in Nazi occupied Germany. In the next chapter, this theme will reappear
as it will be argued that Bonhoeffer was primarily concerned with appropriating the role of the
church within Discipleship in his cultural context. In addition, I will also show how this led him
to a much different interpretation and outcome of relating Christ to culture than Niebuhr did in
Christ and Culture.
Niebuhr and Christology in Christ and Culture
Niebuhr’s representation of Jesus in Christ and Culture is another topic that has
encountered critiques in recent years.72 In fact, the topic received heavy criticism from Yoder,
since Niebuhr’s Christology for him has been said to be “the crucial point on which Niebuhr’s
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book stands or falls.”73 Yoder’s critiques on Niebuhr’s Christology has been so influential that
others have closely followed in his footsteps throughout the years by making similar arguments.
In this relatively brief section, I will show how the critical response to Niebuhr argues that
his operating Christology in Christ and Culture contributes to his alleged agenda of
marginalizing the “against culture” type and how Niebuhr’s Christology allegedly shapes his
presentation of ethics.74
As for Niebuhr’s presentation of Jesus, he offers some of his own interpretations of this key
figure of history in at least a few places. At one point, Niebuhr describes Jesus in the following
way:
Jesus Christ of the New Testament is in our actual history, in history as we remember
and live it, as it shapes our present faith and action. And this Jesus is a definite
person, one and the same whether he appears as a man of flesh and blood or as risen
Lord. He can never be confused with a Socrates, a Plato, or an Aristotle, a Gautama, a
Confucius, or a Mohammed, or even with an Amos or Isaiah . . . there always remain
the original portraits with which all later pictures may be compared and by which all
caricatures may be corrected. And in these original portraits he is recognizably one
and the same. Whatever roles he plays in the varieties of Christian experience, it is
the same Christ who exercises these various offices.75
For Niebuhr, Jesus is “in our actual history” so he is a historical figure. Yet, while “this
Jesus is radically obedient,”76 Niebuhr seems acknowledge a tension with the one who was once
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present in “actual history” and the one who was also within culture itself, since this same Jesus is
also the Son of God who:
. . . [P]oints away from the many values of man’s social life to the One who alone is
good; from the many powers which men use and on which they depend to the One
who alone is powerful; from the many times and seasons of history with their hopes
and fears to the One who is Lord of all times and is alone to be feared and hoped for;
he points away from all that is conditioned to the Unconditioned. He does not direct
attention away from this world to another; but from all worlds, present and future,
material and spiritual, to the One who creates all worlds, who is the Other of all
worlds.77
Critics are quick to jump on this description of Jesus as the one who “points away from the
many values of man’s social life” and who “leads men away from the temporality and pluralism
of culture.”78 By stating that Jesus directs the attention of human beings away from this world,
and thereby away from culture itself, Yoder argues that Niebuhr’s representation of Jesus
presents him primarily as a “moralist” type of teacher “who affirms the transcendence of the
spiritual” with the result that he “condemns concern for this world.”79 For Yoder, this has major
implications.
One such problem with this description for Yoder is that Niebuhr’s presentation of Christ
as a teacher80 supposedly pertains more to what Jesus instructed his followers to abstractly
believe about God rather than establishing him as a kind of teacher who provides concrete, real-
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life lessons for his followers that was meant to influence their social behavior.81 To this extent,
Yoder argues that Niebuhr’s Christ is severely detached from this world:
[Jesus] does not condemn culture because it is particularly sinful, nor does he
condemn aspects of culture because these portions of it are more sinful than others; in
fact, he does not condemn it at all. He simply “points away from” it towards
something else incomparably more important.82
It does not seem to be that Yoder is accusing Niebuhr of presenting his readers with a false
dilemma in that Christ must be thought of as either a teacher of transcendental truths or a teacher
of social ethics. Rather, what Yoder does with these remarks is simply emphasize his running
theme that the way Niebuhr constructed his definition of culture almost necessitates that his
presentation of Christ would be one who accentuates the transcendent over against the material
world. In other words, Yoder accuses Niebuhr of painting a picture of Jesus who “points away
from the world” because Yoder claims that Niebuhr had already defined the nature or reality of
culture and the world as being quite at odds with Christ. Niebuhr’s Reformed background has
with it a Christology that has little to do with making Jesus culturally applicable to this world in
the here-and-now. Speaking of this directly, Yoder writes:
As we compare the Jesus of Richard Niebuhr’s description to the Jesus of the New
Testament and of the history of Christian thought, it becomes evident that Niebuhr
has so set up the question as to make it clear from the outset that Jesus must be by
definition inadequate. To do this, he has excised from his picture of Jesus precisely
those dimensions, clearly present in the biblical witness and in classical theology,
It is very interesting that A. James Reimer makes a similar critique of John Yoder when he writes that
Yoder’s Jesus was “not primarily a moral teacher with political implications, nor a teacher of spirituality who was
misinterpreted politically, nor a sacrificial lamb for the purpose of atonement, but rather, in his prophethood,
priesthood, and kingship, [was] someone who bore the possibility of a new human, social and political order.”
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which would have made impossible the interpretation of Jesus as “pointing away”
from the realm of culture, and thereby as needing the corrective of a “more balanced”
position.83
Yoder further argues that Niebuhr’s presentation of Christ who is “against culture” is
defined by Niebuhr as a straw man and is not a “serious historical possibility for real living
people.”84 In this way, Yoder claims that Niebuhr is marginalizing the “against culture” type
since its adherents take the words of Jesus seriously.
Carter picks up on this theme by claiming that as a result of Niebuhr’s Christ who “points
away” from everything and everyone here on earth, Niebuhr erects a sharp dualism between
Jesus and the created order.85 At the same time, however, Carter does not indicate that he has a
problem with the dualism in and of itself. Instead, what is problematic for Carter is that he claims
Niebuhr establishes an ethical dualism between Jesus and the world. According to Carter, it
arises as:
. . . [A] religious divide along the fault line of recognition or rejection of the lordship
of Jesus Christ. It is temporary and does not arise out of creation, but of the fall. One
day it will be eliminated by the redemption of all creation.86
So, Carter’s problem with Niebuhr in this regard is that he accuses him of positing an
ontological dualism. According to Carter, such an “ontological dualism” has direct consequences
for ethics. He elaborates:
It is not just that Jesus’s so-called strenuous commands in the Sermon on the Mount
and the rest of this teaching are hard to obey because of the prevalence of sin in the
world; Niebuhr seems to believe that these commands are unrealistic given the reality
of the world. Yet, Jesus’s ministry is all about redefining what is real. The idea that
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the Sermon on the Mount could be lived on this earth by a segment of fallen
humanity is rejected as impossible by Niebuhr.87
From Carter’s perspective, living by the Sermon on the Mount is categorically rejected as
being “impossible” for Niebuhr. Jesus is simply ontologically different from the rest of fallen
humanity, so there is no way that people could ever imitate such a heavenly figure as him. Carter
argues that this is because of the way that Niebuhr had framed his definitions of culture and the
way that his Christology flowed from it.
In other words, Carter’s critical perspective argues that in Niebuhr’s alleged ontological
dualism, there is an impenetrable gap between Christ and the created order, and that the
consequences of what flows from it does not remain hidden in the realm of theological
abstraction. Instead, there are real implications for Christians, for humanity, and for this world.
Living by the precepts given in the Sermon on the Mount and imitating Jesus are simply
regarded as impossibilities by Niebuhr, at least according to Carter’s perspective. As a result,
Christians must simply accept that engaging in war has always been and will always be a morally
justifiable option. Carter claims that refusing to accept this position entails that individuals who
deny Niebuhr’s alleged claims about war are then lumped into the “against culture” type and that
they suffer the stigma that is associated with being another “radical.”
Beyond these claims, Carter further argues that given the overall influence of Christ and
Culture, a dualism such as this one has contributed to a theological paradigm that has become
represented in the actions of people who have closely followed Niebuhr’s Christology of
transcendence. The Sermon on the Mount subsequently becomes ignored as a possibility for
Christian ethical ideals. Carter claims that Niebuhr’s “almost mystical figure” of Christ is
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completely uninterested in seemingly normal aspects of human life, with the result that “the feet
of Niebuhr’s Jesus barely touch the earth.”88 Niebuhr’s theology of transcendence allegedly
ignores a theology of presence.
Adding to these attacks, Yoder argues that even though Niebuhr is claiming to be within
the Christological tradition of Nicaea, his actual emphasis on the transcendence of Jesus has little
or no room for his humanity,89 and so Niebuhr is accused of actually departing from Nicene
Christology in his presentation of Christ.90
In the end, Yoder writes that what was ultimately wrong with the question that Niebuhr
“set up” about the relationship of Christ to culture was that his presentation of Christ and of
culture “are so predisposed by his own particular angles on the history of the problem that there
can be no right answer.”91 Yet, “at other times,” Yoder writes, “there is a right answer, and it is
‘transformation.’” The problem for Yoder is that “the reader has not been provided any precise
understandings of the criteria which distinguish valid from invalid modes of carrying out that
project.”92
In other words, despite Niebuhr’s alleged agenda of attacking the “against type,” his critics
accuse him of being vague with the type that he supposedly preferred, and the result is that
readers have been left without having any direction of where to go in order to actually transform
culture. Compared with this apparent ambiguity, what is certain, according to the critics, is that
Niebuhr’s legacy has assured Western readers that living by the Sermon on the Mount is not
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possible within a world such as ours. Abiding by the Sermon on the Mount has been left to the
“radicals” throughout history.
Niebuhr and Christendom in Christ and Culture
In this final section of the chapter, I shall draw attention to the ways that critics of Niebuhr
accuse him of presupposing the notion of Christendom within his concept of culture in Christ
and Culture. Before continuing, however, I must first define what can and cannot be meant by
Christendom within this discussion.
In a broad sense, the Oxford English Dictionary defines Christendom as “the worldwide
body or society of Christians.”93 This seems to be a typical understanding of the word. More
precisely, however, the Westminster Dictionary of Theological Terms defines Christendom as “a
collective sense of Christianity itself” or “a description of Christianity as the dominant
religion.”94 While these definitions of Christendom are extremely similar to one another, and
seem to represent normative usage in American English, it is not these connotations that
Niebuhr’s critics have in mind when they accuse him of having a “Christendom bent” in Christ
and Culture. Even though these may be the standard ways that these terms are understood, critics
think and use Christendom quite differently, so one should not superimpose these general
understandings onto the definitions used by critics of Niebuhr.
With this said, the critical understanding of Christendom goes back more than a century to
Soren Kierkegaard before individuals such as Yoder, Hauerwas and Carter began their critiques
of Christendom. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Kierkegaard launched a series of attacks
93 Angus Stevenson and Maurice Waite, eds., Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 12th ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 254.
94 Donald K. McKim, Westminster Dictionary of Theological Terms (Louisville: Westminster John Knox
Press, 1996), 47.
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on what he referred to as Christendom. His presentation of what Christendom entailed was
drastically different from the typical usage of the word at the time, as he spoke of it pejoratively.
John Lippitt offers a general picture of what Kierkegaard’s criticism included. He writes:
Kierkegaard had long been concerned with the incongruity he saw between “genuine”
Christianity and what he had heard from pulpits, which he saw as a cowardly evasion
of the teaching of the New Testament. This came to a head in the 1850s . . .
Kierkegaard contrasts his view of New Testament Christianity with the establishment
religiosity he labels as “Christendom,” famously proclaiming the need to “introduce
Christianity into Christendom.” In the last two years of his life, this “attack upon
Christendom” became venomous. In a series of articles, he accused the church of
rank hypocrisy in betraying the message of the gospel, a particular target being Jakob
Peter Mynster, Bishop of Zealand and Primate of the Danish State (later Danish
People’s) Church. In the midst of this furor, Kierkegaard collapsed in the street, dying
in hospital some weeks later, on 11 November 1855, at the age of 42.95
Lippitt claims that Kierkegaard’s attacks were “venomous.” As such, Kierkegaard spoke of
Christendom in ways far removed from the general connotation of the word, as he juxtaposed it
to what he describes as “New Testament Christianity.” According to Lippitt, Christendom for
Kierkegaard is “establishment religiosity.” Yet, as John Elrod indicates, Kierkegaard’s notion of
Christendom is not simply the visible entity of the state church, but is something much more:
[Christendom, for Kierkegaard is] the modern liberal state which is legitimized and
sanctioned by religion in the form of the Danish church. Christendom is the fall of
life from the high plane of ethics to the aesthetic view of life, where pleasure is
conceived of as the highest good. Christendom is the legitimating of the political
pursuit of one’s private interests devoid of ethical obligation to the other.96
Elrod’s description seems to reflect what Kierkegaard has to say about Christendom in his
attacks. To this extent, Kierkegaard describes Christendom in the following way:
What Christianity wanted was chastity—to do away with the whorehouse. The
change [from Christianity to “Christendom”] is this, that the whorehouse remains
John Lippitt, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kierkegaard and Fear and Trembling (London:
Routledge, 2003), 4-5.
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exactly what it was in paganism, lewdness in the same proportion, but it has become
a “Christian” whorehouse . . . the change from paganism is this: that everything has
remained unchanged, but has assumed the predicate “Christian.”97
According to Kierkegaard, the culture of Christendom is not much different than other
cultures throughout the world, except that Christendom retains the old artifacts of previous
cultures and then prescribes them with new, so-called “Christian” names. Yet, their functions
within culture remain the same as they did before. Culture, for Kierkegaard, can be thoroughly
“Christian” in this sense. The only changes that substantially occur within Christendom is that
“everything” simply gains a new predicate in that it becomes “Christian” by name only. It is not
that those former aspects of culture have been redeemed or transformed, or that they have
become something entirely different.
Instead, such a description like the one above is indicative that they still exist for
Kierkegaard, but merely receive a new name under the cultural umbrella of Christendom. Once
this happens, they are regarded as being sanctified by the majority of the population, while at the
same time “society” remains “thoroughly base.”98
Narrowing the word down even further, Kierkegaard argues that when the church or even
when individual Christians accommodate to culture, the very heart of what it means to be
Christian is lost with the transition. This means that people residing within such a culture that
Kierkegaard describes as Christendom may indeed profess beliefs and may engage in rituals that
seemingly harmonize with historic Christianity. Within the culture of Christendom, however,
Kierkegaard argues that the possession of abstract beliefs and the visible markers of rituals
among the population may be widely accepted as the normative way in which a Christian can be
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differentiated from a non-Christian, but that such identity markers are ultimately misleading.
Kierkegaard argues the reason for this is because following what “New Testament Christianity”
prescribes entails more than mere external association with a group within society. This attack
from Kierkegaard has been described as a “social critique”99 directed towards “bourgeois
Christendom,” or which was arguably the majority population of the culture within Denmark at
the time.100 What is necessary for Christianity to be true Christianity, according to Kierkegaard, is
discipleship.
To this extent, within Kierkegaard’s attacks, he repeatedly claims that characteristics that
differentiated Christians from non-Christians throughout the pages of the New Testament do not
exist within the culture of Christendom. Themes such as discipleship and suffering for the sake
of Christ entail public manifestations of the Christian faith for Kierkegaard, whereas within
Christendom, faith is reduced to the possession of abstract beliefs and engaging in rituals behind
closed doors. For Kierkegaard, the prevailing assumption in the culture of Christendom is that
every person within the geographical boundaries of the nation is considered to be a “Christian.”
In Rethinking Christ and Culture, Carter describes Kierkegaard as launching the “single
greatest attack on Christendom during the past two centuries.”101 As far as what Christendom
entails, Carter explicitly expounds upon it in the book when he writes:
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In 1951, when Christ and Culture was first published, Christendom was taken for
granted within North American Protestantism. So it was quite natural that, rather than
challenging it in his book, Niebuhr presupposed it.102
Some theologians speak of Christendom in a way that seems to harmonize well with what
most people simply regard as Christianity, just like what fits the dictionary definition of the term.
Others, like Carter, Yoder and Hauerwas are quite critical of it and do not use it interchangeably
with Christianity.103 However, North American Protestants, such as Niebuhr, simply assume its
legitimacy. Critics claim that Niebuhr was too trapped within his own culture to even recognize
it. But, in Carter’s estimation, there is more to Christendom than one might suspect:
Christendom is the concept of Western civilization as having a religious arm (the
church) and a secular arm (the civil government), both of which are united in their
adherence to Christian faith, which is seen as the so-called soul of Europe or the
West. The essence of the idea is that the assertion that Western civilization is
Christian. Within this Christian civilization, the state and the church have different
roles to play, but, since membership in both is coterminous, both can be seen as
aspects of one unified reality—Christendom.104
Compared with popular definitions of Christendom, Carter speaks of it pejoratively in a
way reminiscent to Kierkegaard. Not only does it stretch beyond its typical understanding of “a
description of Christianity as the dominant religion,”105 but contained within Carter’s description
of Christendom are presuppositions that unite the church with the civil government. According to
Carter, Niebuhr assumed this perspective of Christendom:

102

Carter, Rethinking Christ and Culture, 14.

Peter Leithart provides a thorough response to individuals such as Yoder, Hauerwas and Carter in his book,
Defending Constantine. Since the goal of the thesis is not to primarily engage Niebuhr, I shall sideline those
criticisms that Leithart made against Yoder. If space was not an issue, Leithart’s book would certainly be worthy of
engagement, as even Stanley Hauerwas has spoken favorably about it. For Hauerwas’ response to Defending
Constantine, see Stanley Hauerwas, “Defending Constantine: The Twilight of an Empire and the Dawn of
Christendom,” Christian Century 127, no. 21 (October 19, 2010): 48–49.
103

104

Carter, Rethinking Christ and Culture, 14–15.

105

McKim, Westminster Dictionary of Theological Terms, 47.

36

It is taken for granted by Niebuhr that, since Western culture is Christian, Christians
therefore have a responsibility for culture and must be realistic in relating faith in a
Christ who really does not fit within any human culture to Western Christendom.
Christendom is presupposed, and the problem is how to relate Christ to it.106
So, according to Carter, Christendom is that realm of Western civilization where the
teachings of Christ must be accommodated in order to fit the “realistic” social structures that
enable society to function and to prosper. Carter claims that Niebuhr simply presupposed this
notion. His task, at least from Carter’s perspective, was to be responsible and realistic with the
ways he understood the relationship between Christ and culture.
Beyond this definition, Carter also describes Christendom as “a series of compromises
made by the church with the world so that the offense of Jesus Christ is watered down”107 which
began with Constantine and the empire that he built around Christianity.108 Even after the
collapse of Rome, Christendom, according to this perspective, did not cease to exist as it
continued to thrive in some form for centuries.109 Carter describes this as a “bad idea”110 as it
produced the “hatred, persecution, and destruction of Jews, dissenting Christians, and nonWestern native peoples.”111
Carter argues that such atrocities were not simply a “peripheral flaw” of this understanding
of Christendom, but were “the normal, natural, inevitable outcome of forcing Christianity on the
population and using it as the ideology that justifies the ruling powers that be.”112 Carter
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continues by claiming that when we think of Christendom like this within the context of the
Western world, we should be quick to reply that it was brought on by Constantine, even though
Yoder’s term of Constantianism is not necessarily tied to him as a person.
Critics further claim that given the extent of how deeply pervasive this sort of
Constantinian or Christendom mentality is among Western Christians, a fundamental shift must
take place in the discussion of Christ and culture that moves beyond the Niebuhrian five-fold
typology. Not only is there need for more cultural awareness in the Christ and culture discussion,
but there is also a need for increased cultural sensitivity, especially to others outside of the
Americas and Europe.
From the critical standpoint, accusations against Niebuhr are common that claim he simply
assumed that these notions behind Constantianism or even Christendom were acceptable ways
for Christ to bring about change in this world. Whether the critiques come from Yoder,
Hauerwas or Carter, they all seem to assert that any discussion that refuses to interact with how
these presuppositions may or may not contribute to real-life consequences is simply missing the
point, and is continuing to build upon Niebuhr’s skewed and misleading presuppositions that
further distort the true countercultural nature of the church.
The alternative for Niebuhr’s critics is to rediscover and reapply the Sermon on the Mount
by the church in society. Pursuing and living out the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount is one
of the primary ways that this fundamental shift back to what they describe as “the New
Testament” can be appropriated within any culture. Hauerwas echoes this precisely when he
writes:
[The Sermon on the Mount is] words for the colony, a prefiguration of the kinds of
community in which the reign of God will shine in all its glory. So there is nothing
private in the demands of the Sermon. It is very public, very political, very social in
that it depicts the public form by which the colony shall witness to the world that God
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really is busy redeeming humanity, reconciling the world to himself in Christ. All
Christian ethical issues are therefore social, political, communal issues. Can we so
order our life in the colony that the world might look at us and know that God is
busy?113
Hauerwas continues by providing a partial answer to his previous question:
For us [Christians], the world has ended. We may have thought that Jesus came to
make nice people even nicer, that Jesus hoped to make a democratic Caesar just a bit
more democratic, to make the world a bit better place for the poor. The Sermon [on
the Mount], however, collides with such accomodationist thinking. It drives us back
to a completely new conception of what it means for people to live with one another.
That completely new conception is the church. All that we have heard said of old is
thrown up for grabs, demands to be reexamined, and pushed back to square one.
Square one is that colony made up of those who are special, different, alien, and
distinctive only in the sense that they are those who have heard Jesus say “Follow
me,” and have come forth to be part of a new people, a colony formed by hearing his
invitation and saying yes.114
For Yoder, Hauerwas, and Carter, the words of Jesus—especially those in the Sermon on
the Mount—are to be taken seriously. But these contemporary critics are not alone. Years before
their voices became heard in the Christ and culture discussion, Bonhoeffer in Discipleship placed
special emphasis on the Sermon on the Mount. As such, Bonhoeffer and the critics of Niebuhr all
argue that when the church begins to appropriate these precepts from the Sermon on the Mount
in the cultural moment, change may indeed transpire. Yet, change, or from Niebuhr’s
perspective, transformation, is not the ultimate goal. Rather, what the critics of today claim who
echo Bonhoeffer is that the goal is simply to be obedient for the sake of Jesus and his call, even
if change does not occur.
As this thesis progresses, I will demonstrate that these three areas where Niebuhr
encountered the harshest critique in Christ and Culture were addressed by Dietrich Bonhoeffer—
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a rough contemporary of Niebuhr—in Discipleship. In all three of these areas (that is, in regard
to culture, Christology, and Christendom) I shall explore both how and why Bonhoeffer comes to
the conclusions that he does in Discipleship. In the process, such an examination will not only
give us a better understanding of Bonhoeffer in this period of his theological development but it
will also give us the opportunity to look at another text besides Christ and Culture that deals
with the “enduring problem” that Niebuhr describes.
In the end, Bonhoeffer will confront the enduring problem in his own way, while offering
his own solutions to his own countrymen, and he will do it within his own concrete moment with
situational discernment.
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CHAPTER TWO
BONHOEFFER AND HIS CULTURAL MOMENT
In this final chapter, I will specifically narrow down the answer to our main question. By
doing so, I will show that Discipleship provides such a different outcome than Niebuhr of
relating Christ to culture because Bonhoeffer interprets and applies the themes of culture,
Christendom and Christology quite unlike Niebuhr, at least according to the critical response
towards Christ and Culture.
As for Discipleship, Bonhoeffer had his own goals in mind from the onset of the book. The
editors of Discipleship summarize a key theme in regard to Bonhoeffer’s cultural situation that
focuses upon his own attempts to arrive at situational specificity. They write:
Discipleship was the largest and most influential book published by Dietrich
Bonhoeffer during his lifetime. Within its pages he confronts his readers time and
again with his own stark challenges to their facile, less than Christlike ways of being
Christian. What did it mean to declare oneself a follower of Jesus Christ? What were
Christians to do about the seemingly “impossible demands” of Jesus’ Sermon on the
Mount? How effective and relevant were the Matthean Beatitudes against the
materialism, militarism, and ruthless dictatorship that had come to dominate Germany
in Bonhoeffer’s own time? How were Christians to act responsibly in the Church
Struggle created by Hitler and Nazism? These were the issues that had disturbed
Bonhoeffer during the gestation period of this book.115
Such editorial comments are reflective of Bonhoeffer’s own questions that he presents to
readers in the preface to Discipleship. There, he probes his readers to reflectively ask:
115 Geffrey B. Kelly and John D. Godsey, “Editors’ Introduction to the English Edition,” in Dietrich
Bonhoeffer, Discipleship, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, Volume 4, ed. Geffrey B. Kelly and John D. Godsey, trans.
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What did Jesus want to say to us? What does he want from us today? How does he
help us to be faithful Christians today? It is not ultimately important to us what this or
that church leader wants. Rather, we want to know what Jesus wants.116
Following these questions, Bonhoeffer narrows these kinds of questions down to a
contextually specific one. He was certainly aware of how Christians were accommodating
themselves to the political powers of his day, yet at the same time, they were still retaining much
of their pietistic language and religious appearances. On the surface, they were Christians. Many
participated in Christian worship and other Christian activities. Yet, what was missing, according
to Bonhoeffer, was convincing, righteous action that was obedient to Jesus’ commands.117 This
would, in turn, have relevancy to the actual needs within society if it happened. Yet there was an
absence. So he asks his readers a series of questions:
What could the call to follow Jesus mean today for the worker, the businessman, the
farmer, or the soldier? Could it bring an intolerable dilemma into the existence of
persons working in the world who are Christian? Is Christianity, defined as following
Jesus, a possibility for too small a number of people? Does it imply a rejection of the
great masses of people and contempt for the weak and poor? Does it thereby deny the
great mercy of Jesus Christ, who came to the sinners and tax-collectors, the poor and
the weak, the misguided and despairing? What should we say to that? Is it a few, or
many, who belong with Jesus?118
Note that Bonhoeffer is asking his readers about what following Jesus could mean for them
“today.” Questions like these provide an indication that Bonhoeffer is at the least asking how one
should live as a Christian within his own, unique cultural context. Bonhoeffer is not writing a
timeless theological treatise. In fact, the questions that Bonhoeffer asks his readers resonates
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with the tension that Niebuhr later described as “the enduring problem” several years later.
Niebuhr introduced it as:
It is helpful to remember that the question of Christianity and civilization is by no
means a new one; that Christian perplexity in this area has been perennial, and that
the problem has been an enduring one through all the Christian centuries. It is helpful
also to recall that the repeated struggles of Christians with this problem have yielded
no single Christian answer . . .119
Bonhoeffer seems to have been asking the same general questions about relating Christ to
culture that Niebuhr set out to address in Christ and Culture, even though he asked them years
before Niebuhr did with his book. The questions that Bonhoeffer raises in the Preface of
Discipleship establish one of the major themes that will be found throughout the remainder of the
book. These questions suggest that there is a “cost” to following Jesus in this world beyond ritual
and beyond pietistic language. At least one of the implications in the Preface suggests that when
Christians abandon the pursuit of righteous action, then they lose their social credibility.
Consequently, the grace that they speak of becomes “cheap.”120
Within this chapter, I shall demonstrate that Discipleship provides such a different outcome
than Niebuhr did of relating Christ to culture because Bonhoeffer interprets and applies the
themes of culture, Christendom and Christology quite unlike Niebuhr by focusing upon the
counter-cultural impulses of the Sermon on the Mount. Bonhoeffer’s goal is admittedly
prescriptive in nature whereas (despite the critical argument) Niebuhr’s goal was admittedly
descriptive.
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Bonhoeffer and Culture in Discipleship
Given the contemporary criticism of Niebuhr’s presentation of the word culture, it seems to
be apparent that the meaning of the word is not self-evident. Even after the years following the
publication of Christ and Culture, theologians continue to debate its meaning and how it should
be properly understood within a twenty-first century context. As a result of the possible
confusion of what is meant by culture, I shall first define Bonhoeffer’s perspective on culture in
Discipleship.
As I have previously shown, Niebuhr’s presentation of culture has encountered harsh
criticism from contemporary critics like Yoder, most notably as a result that individuals like
Yoder accuse Niebuhr of either using the term too broadly or in ways that other critics claim are
ambiguous. Despite such criticism, Niebuhr’s understanding of culture has arguably been a
dominating voice within the discussions pertaining to Christ and culture.
Regarding this theme, Niebuhr himself acknowledged the difficulty of arriving at a
definition of culture.121 As previously indicated, there are places throughout Christ and Culture
where he attempts to provide clarity about the meaning of the term, especially when he indicates
that culture consists of “language, habits, ideas, beliefs, customs, social organization, inherited
artifacts, technical processes, and values.”122 In this sense, culture, for Niebuhr, is inherently
social, and since the social existence of mankind has been impacted by the fall, Niebuhr claims
that culture is also what the writers of the New Testament “had in mind” when they wrote about
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“the world.”123 From this perspective, Niebuhr is indicating that culture and the world should be
considered interchangeable or synonymous terms within his project.
While there are indeed many ways to elaborate upon the specifics of what culture does or
does not entail beyond Niebuhr, his perspective actually offers what Carson describes as a “fairly
plastic concept.”124 Carson’s comment indicates that Niebuhr’s perspective is general and that it
reflects the popular connotation of the word. Considering that I have consulted Niebuhr already
in this thesis, and that his influence is vast, I shall use this concept of culture as a starting point to
think about how culture is addressed in Discipleship.
On the onset, it is interesting to note that while Bonhoeffer does not specifically use the
word culture (kultur) throughout Discipleship, he frequently uses the world in ways that often
parallel Niebuhr’s broad definition of culture. In fact, the most basic theme of culture, at least
how the term is broadly presented by Niebuhr, is addressed very early in Discipleship.
In the preface to Discipleship, Bonhoeffer presents the reader with three questions that
explicitly pertain to relating Christ to culture. These questions are, however, ones that were
addressed to a very specific culture, and so, they are arguably culturally contextual questions
because they were specifically intended for his German audience. When Bonhoeffer asks, “What
did Jesus want to say to us? What does he want from us today? How does he help us to be
faithful Christians today?”125 the words us and today are strong signals that Bonhoeffer is
providing the context for the book. Such questions were not arbitrary ones that Bonhoeffer was
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asking, as they are also the ones that had “disturbed”126 Bonhoeffer around the time of his life
when he wrote Discipleship.
Similarly, these three questions are also those which would have sparked the interest for
what Kelly describes as the “average”127 German Christians, as they were constantly hearing
much of “what this or that church leader wants”128 and hearing little of what Jesus himself had to
say. To this extent, Kelly and Godsey indicate that Christians throughout Germany were
accommodating their faith to the political powers of the day and were dismissing the Sermon on
the Mount as containing “impossible ideals.”129 It seems as if the contextual situation that
Bonhoeffer was part of at the time was one where German Christians listened to everyone except
Jesus Christ. That seems to have been Bonhoeffer’s impression, anyway.
From Bonhoeffer’s perspective, the theme of discipleship in the 1930s for many in
Germany was simply an abstract, theological concept and was far removed from living a life of
sacrificial obedience to Christ. Such a social context is undoubtedly broad and is inclusive of
many people, yet it is one that provides something of a rough cultural context that will
subsequently shape the way that the theme of culture is presented within Discipleship.
Granted, while these three initial questions that Bonhoeffer asks his readers do not contain
the terms to follow or to imitate Christ, Peter Frick claims that the questions still function as the
theme of the book, despite the absence of words that echo the title of Discipleship. For Frick, the
questions contain “the substance of the whole work [of Discipleship],” as they leave “no doubt
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that what it means to follow Christ is the key point on almost every page.”130 Even though there
is a cultural context with these questions, they were also questions that were deeply personal for
Bonhoeffer, as these questions relating Christ to culture were those that he was asking himself at
the time. In fact, one of Bonhoeffer’s most regularly cited perspectives on the relationship
between the church and the world comes from his pen in his Letters and Papers from Prison.
Bonhoeffer not only reflects on this theme but also speaks of it within the context of
Discipleship. He writes:
In the last few years I have come to know and understand more and more the
profound this-worldliness of Christianity. The Christian is not a homo religiosus but
simply a human being, in the same way that Jesus was a human being . . . I remember
a conversation I had thirteen years ago in America with a young French pastor. We
had simply asked ourselves what we really wanted to do with our lives. And he said, I
want to become a saint (—and I think it’s possible that he did become one). This
impressed me very much at the time. Nevertheless, I disagreed with him, saying
something like: I want to learn how to have faith. For a long time I did not understand
the depth of this antithesis. I thought I myself could learn to have faith by trying to
live something like a saintly life. I suppose I wrote Discipleship at the end of this
path. Today I clearly see the dangers of that book, though I still stand by it. Later on I
discovered, and I am still discovering to this day, that one only learns to have faith by
living in the full this-worldliness of life.131
The complexity of Bonhoeffer’s thought in these latter moments of his life has been widely
discussed among scholars throughout the years.132 Despite all that could be said of it, the theme
of “religionless Christianity” was mentioned explicitly in another one of Bonhoeffer’s letters to
Bethge just two months prior before this one above was written. In that earlier correspondence,
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Bonhoeffer told Bethge that “I am thinking a great deal about what this religionless Christianity
looks like, what form it takes, and I’ll be writing you more about it soon.”133 Bonhoeffer’s later
reflections upon Discipleship in this letter above, therefore, come from within a context where
Bonhoeffer was ruminating about “religionless Christianity” that indicate that the question of
Christ and culture was still plaguing his mind. Of course, interpreters have differed in their
outcomes of whether or not Bonhoeffer relegated the church to an “ecclesiastical ghetto” within
Discipleship.134 Whatever one thinks of this issue, one must be sure not to anachronistically
conceive of Bonhoeffer’s perspectives of the relationship between Christ and culture within
Discipleship from later materials. To be sure, there might be similarities, but Bonhoeffer’s
Discipleship era came at an entirely different point in his life compared to the time of his prison
letters to Bethge and others.
As far as Discipleship is concerned, the Christ and culture question was present for him
then, too. All throughout the book, Bonhoeffer is not only asking, but is also responding to what
Haddon Willmer indicates is one of Bonhoeffer’s recurring questions, which is, “How do I live a
Christian life in this real world?”135 In fact, Willmer’s synopsis coincides with a statement that
Bonhoeffer makes in the first chapter, as he indicates that “our church’s predicament is proving
more and more clearly to be a question of how we are to live as Christians today.”136 Shortly after
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this statement, Bonhoeffer describes discipleship (nachfolge) as a way of life that is rooted in
grace.137
Considering that nearly two-thirds of Discipleship is an exposition of the Sermon on the
Mount, Bonhoeffer presents these initial questions as those which will subsequently receive
contextually specific answers in light of this section of the Bible. Since the questions are
contextually specific, Bonhoeffer’s responses to them throughout the book are also culturally
specific as economic materialism, patriotic militarism and ruthless racism are addressed, which
were the very same issues that many Christians in Nazi Germany had to deal with in their
lives.138
Therefore, the questions are not only those which are personal for Bonhoeffer, but are also
those which were important for the average German Christian to consider. The editors of
Discipleship expand upon this picture of the historical background:
The world of Bonhoeffer’s original readers . . . was in open rebellion against the
limits that constituted Christian values in a civil society. In Discipleship, Bonhoeffer
attempts to confront the seductive lure held out to Germany’s citizens, asking them to
divorce themselves from what Nazi ideology portrayed as the less than fully
Germanic world redeemed by Jesus Christ—a world portrayed as “polluted” by
subhumans like Jews and gypsies, in addition to those out of favor with the
government through their dissenting ways.139
Bonhoeffer’s own life situation and the personal questions that he was asking within the
book account for what Green describes as the autobiographical dimension of Discipleship.
However, Green admits that this explanation alone does not provide a complete and exhaustive
grid for interpreting the entirety of the book. In addition to the autobiographical aspects, Green
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and others also explore the exegetical, ecclesiastical and political dimensions that are also
contained within Discipleship and argue that the book should not be decontextualized if one is to
truly understand Bonhoeffer’s thought and argument.
While each of these dimensions contribute to the various ways that Discipleship can be
interpreted, the autobiographical dimension, especially in regard to the set of questions addressed
early in the book, emphasize that Discipleship was an immensely personal project for
Bonhoeffer. It was one that also had a special place in the hearts and minds of his students at
Finkenwalde,140 as Bethge claims that “entire sections of his lectures went straight into the
book.”141 Not only this, but if Bonhoeffer had the opportunity, he would have dedicated
Discipleship to his students. In a Christmas letter that circulated in 1937, Bonhoeffer wrote the
following to his former students at Finkenwalde:
Since the book appeared in print, I have often dedicated it in spirit to all of you. That
I did not do so explicitly on the title page is due to the fact that I did not want to claim
your support for my own thoughts and theology—our community has another
foundation.142
What this snapshot provides is a reminder that there is a contextually specific situation
happening around Bonhoeffer, and that he is personally engaged within it. The questions that he
asks early in the book are those which provide the conceptual framework for understanding the
remainder of the book. He is not simply writing to the “average German Christian,” but as he
indicates here, he had his students in mind. His major issue for them is to help them answer the
question of what Jesus wants of “us.”
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While Bonhoeffer does not elaborate on the word culture throughout Discipleship, the
concept of relating Christ to culture—or, in his words, “to us,” to his culture—is not only
present, but serves as “the theme of the book,” as Frick indicated. In Niebuhrian terms,
Discipleship is Bonhoeffer’s attempt to relate Christ to culture. Yet, this is not just any culture,
but is a very specific one in Germany, with specific recipients in mind.
Hence, Bonhoeffer, in his attempt to relate Christ to culture, introduces Discipleship with
his own questions that sound very familiar to the ones that Niebuhr later asks in the introduction
of Christ and Culture. For Niebuhr, “the enduring problem” of relating Christ to culture was “by
no means a new one,” as he urged his readers to consider that “the repeated struggles of
Christians . . . have yielded no single Christian answer.”143 In spite of the critical perspective on
Niebuhr, his vision was admittedly to describe “typical Christian answers” to this problem,
whereas for Bonhoeffer, his goal was admittedly prescriptive as he sought to answer the question
of “what Jesus wants” for “us” by asking “a question of how we are to live as Christians
today.”144
While Niebuhr introduced his book admittedly to describe the “typical Christian answers,”
this was not Bonhoeffer’s goal, as it was “not ultimately important” for Bonhoeffer to sift
through “what this or that church leader wants.”145 Bonhoeffer, instead, was gravely concerned
for obedience to “the pure word of Jesus,”146 which involved deconstruction of the “dissonant
sounds,” the “human, harsh laws,” and the “false hopes and consolations” which obscure the
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words of Jesus.147 Bonhoeffer’s concern was not to accommodate Christianity to his culture, but
to give solid answers in the concrete moment even if that meant countering the majority of the
opinions held by others in his culture.
Hence, even within the first few pages of Discipleship, Bonhoeffer is arguing that his
project is not a general systematic text, or what he described as an “academic affair.”148
Bonhoeffer’s project, instead, is a critical engagement of relating Christ to culture that reflects
his own cultural and existential reality. The initial questions that he asks are not only personal
questions, but are those which are representative of the kinds of questions that were being asked
(or, in Bonhoeffer’s estimation, questions that should have been asked) by the German Christian
population and especially his previous students.
Beyond this, the theme of culture is also contained within Bonhoeffer’s usage of today as
he is using it to describe the behaviors and beliefs that were characteristic of his particular social
setting. As previously stated, Bonhoeffer introduces today in his initial three questions but it is
also contained in his remarks about “our church’s predicament” which is a “question of how we
are to live as Christians today.”149 He is speaking of the present tense situation happening in Nazi
controlled Germany. Even though today is not frequently used throughout Discipleship, it does,
however, appear in scattered places, and his chief concern with using it seems to be tethering out
the meaning of faith in his present cultural context.
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This is certainly the case in the Preface when Bonhoeffer asks the reader, “What could the
call to follow Jesus mean today for the worker, the businessman, the farmer, or the solider?”150
Such a question is an indication that Bonhoeffer is searching for answers of what those three
questions mean to the “average” German Christian—that individual who was arguably caught in
the crossfire, surrounded by competing voices that often contradicted one another. Out of all
those people looking to be heard, Bonhoeffer’s question in the midst of their voices is, “Who
should be given the attention?” From the onset of the book, Bonhoeffer unabashedly claims that
it is not “opinions”151 that matter, but hearing the “call of Jesus Christ himself”152 coming through
the words of Scripture.
For Bonhoeffer, the call that Jesus gives to his followers in the twentieth century is just as
active and living as it was when Jesus walked upon the earth and spoke to his disciples. This is
seen in part two of Discipleship where Bonhoeffer asks the question, “How, then, does [Jesus’]
call to discipleship reach us today?”153 According to Bonhoeffer, “Jesus was bodily present” to
his twelve disciples, and the call that he directed to them was, of course, an audible one, as he
said to them, “Follow me.”154 Yet, even though “Jesus no longer walks past me in bodily form”
as he did with the twelve, he is also “present with us today, in bodily form and with his word.”155
Therefore, the disciples did not have “an advantage” over individuals living in the twentieth
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century, for “Christ speaks to us exactly as he spoke to them.”156 Jesus may no longer make
footprints in the dirt by walking around the Sea of Galilee, but he is just as active in the world
now as he was two millennia ago. This is because Jesus is present with those who are following
him.
These serve as merely a few examples of how Bonhoeffer employs today throughout
Discipleship. While its frequency is relatively sparse, only appearing over twenty times or so
throughout Discipleship, a much more common word that Bonhoeffer uses to describe his
cultural situation is the world. Compared to the infrequency of today, the world is replete
throughout Discipleship. What seems to be significant with Bonhoeffer’s usage of the world is
that he is attempting to echo the language of the New Testament and is concerned with its
relevancy for his cultural situation.
According to Bethge, the Discipleship phase of Bonhoeffer’s life was one where he viewed
“the world as a dangerous jungle that had to be traversed.”157 To be sure, this is only a short
description of the world, but Bethge’s depiction of it for Bonhoeffer underscores a significant
point about how Bonhoeffer regarded his cultural situation.
Beyond these claims from Bethge, clues to how Bonhoeffer regarded his cultural situation
can be seen in the preface of Discipleship where Bonhoeffer identifies that those obstructions
making Jesus “more difficult”158 for people to encounter were happening “today” in his own
cultural situation. Just a few pages later, in his opening remarks in the first chapter, Bonhoeffer
identifies that “cheap grace is the mortal enemy of our church” and that it is also happening
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“today.”159 In other words, what Bonhoeffer regards as the manifestation of “cheap grace” was a
present reality happening in his very own midst. For Bonhoeffer, of course, his concept of
“cheap grace” is juxtaposed to “costly grace,” and while he provides details about what is meant
by these often discussed phrases, within his discussion of them he argues that costly grace is that
which must be protected from “the world.”160
Such a juxtaposition presented in this way suggests to the reader that “cheap grace,” or that
which he regards as “the mortal enemy of our church” not only exists “today,” but that it also
resides in “the world.”161 In this context, costly grace is “God’s holy treasure” that requires
protection from cheap grace, which Bonhoeffer considers “the mortal enemy.” Based upon the
way he describes these terms, it would seem, therefore, that Bonhoeffer is introducing his readers
to a dualism, one that would juxtapose “the church” and “the world” throughout the book and
would put them at odds with each other. In other words, Bonhoeffer presents an opposition
between the two, and one that appears to be irreconcilable. Perhaps this distinction is what has
contributed to some interpreters describing the church as functioning as an “ecclesiastical ghetto”
within Discipleship. But, as we will see, there may be more to Bonhoeffer’s terminology than
one might suspect, especially if one reads Discipleship through American eyes.
At any rate, in a 1936 draft for a catechism, Bonhoeffer wrote, “[the] world [in the Bible] is
everything which wants to pull my heart away from God.”162 Based upon this, and the way that
he treats the terms in Discipleship, it seems that some part of culture, or, more precisely, “the
world” for Bonhoeffer, is unequivocally that which is in opposition to God. Language like this
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seems to suggest that Bonhoeffer would urge others to escape culture or the world like those who
are “against culture.” Then again, seen in the broader context of Discipleship, Bonhoeffer’s
description of the world has a particular and subtle nuance. Bethge identifies it as the following:
The world has not disappeared; its dominion is very evident. Yet it would be a
mistake to interpret this as Bonhoeffer’s attempt to escape from the world. The ghetto
of Discipleship is not the peaceful backwater of the pietists, nor is it the
otherworldliness of the visionaries, neither of whom are particularly loyal to the
world. Discipleship is a call to battle, it is concentration and hence restriction, so that
the entire earth may be reconquered by the infinite message.163
As early as the first chapter, Bonhoeffer begins using the world repeatedly. At times, it
seems that Bonhoeffer intends his readers to assume a completely negative understanding of the
world. Popular interpretations of Discipleship often take this perspective.
For example, Bonhoeffer indicates that it “is inevitable” that a Christian should completely
break (bruch) with his former way of life.164 According to Bonhoeffer, such a break should not
be understood as mere emotional resignation, nor should it be regarded as simply an existential
parting of ways with the thought patterns and random behaviors that may have represented an
individual in the past. Instead, the break that Bonhoeffer describes is one that involves a clear,
sharp, and external detachment that is analogous to the manner in which Abraham left his life
situation upon his calling from God. Bonhoeffer uses the story of Abraham in order to emphasize
that the disciple of Jesus is also “prepared to make it visible at any time.”165
The language of a break from culture is not foreign to the way that Niebuhr later regarded
the behaviors of those within the “against culture” type. Tolstoy, according to Niebuhr,
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performed a break with culture.166 From Niebuhr’s perspective, this amounted to Tolstoy’s
departure from the normative and dominant streams of culture to what Niebuhr describes as a
“separated community.”167 Of course, the thematic aspect of “breaking off” from mainstream
Christianity was certainly expressed by Kierkegaard in his attacks, as he argued that “the New
Testament obliges”168 people to be disciples of Christ through the imitation of Christ. According
to Kierkegaard, since the goals of the state and of “New Testament Christianity” are antithetical
to each other, especially in the role of oaths, a “break” is necessary in order to be obedient to
Christ.169 The editors of Discipleship note that Bonhoeffer interacted with Kierkegaard’s
Journals on this exact theme.170
As for Bonhoeffer, he describes this break as one that is absolutely necessary. Disciples of
Jesus are to make their break that “separates them from the world”171 because, as he later argues,
“being set apart from the world”172 is a prerequisite to holiness. Similar phrases pertaining to
separation are common throughout Discipleship, but if they are taken by themselves, and are
divorced from their historical context, they can appear to suggest that Bonhoeffer is promoting a
perspective similar to the ways that Kierkegaard created a sharp antithesis between
“Christendom” and “New Testament Christianity.”
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Despite the various and seemingly negative instances of the world within Discipleship, the
editors claim that Bonhoeffer’s “countercultural perspective”173 pertaining to the world was
rather unique to him. As such, this “countercultural perspective” was “not a flight from the
world, but a struggle to establish a critical church presence in the world.”174 In a sense, therefore,
this break was not so much a deconstruction as it was for Kierkegaard, but rather, for
Bonhoeffer, it was an attempt at reformation.
Descriptions from other scholars seem to refute this perspective. For example, Green
describes Discipleship as Bonhoeffer’s “most ecclesiastical and ‘anti-world’ book,” and Gides
claims that Bonhoeffer’s Discipleship phase “shares similar themes” 175 with Niebuhr’s “against
culture” type in that Bonhoeffer “uncompromisingly affirms the sole authority of Christ over the
Christian and resolutely rejects culture’s claims to loyalty.”176 Gides, therefore, suggests that
Bonhoeffer’s Discipleship fits well into Niebuhr’s “against culture” type which would put him
alongside of individuals such as Tolstoy and Tertullian.
On the other hand, Jennifer McBride challenges this kind of perspective when she claims
that Americans typically encounter a problem when reading Discipleship—and especially when
reading of Bonhoeffer’s comments regarding culture or the world.177 What happens, according to
McBride, is that the cultural disconnect between now and Nazi Germany makes Bonhoeffer’s
perspectives almost unintelligible to contemporary Americans. The culture from where Niebuhr
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was writing, and the culture from where Bonhoeffer was writing were actually two worlds apart.
Due to the vast differences it would seem on the surface that to be “against” culture in one does
not necessarily mean the same thing in the other. Critics of Niebuhr have accused him of being
optimistic about the role of government and society, whereas Bonhoeffer certainly had a
pessimistic perspective about the Nazis and the society they were creating.
In order to demonstrate this sort of cultural disconnect, McBride argues that American
readers in particular are susceptible to misinterpret what these seemingly “anti-cultural” remarks
of Bonhoeffer entail. The crux of the problem, writes McBride, is one of cultural disconnect
when modern readers of Discipleship read the book in an ahistorical way and inject a particularly
American notion of what is meant by a “countercultural” perspective into Bonhoeffer’s thought.
Not only this, but reading Discipleship through American eyes puts a very American conception
on how Bonhoeffer uses the words such as the church and the world. In order to see Bonhoeffer
in Discipleship more clearly, one must attempt to look at the text with German eyes during the
Nazi era, which is the way the book was intended to be read.
This has implications for the Christ and culture discussion. Given the popularity of Christ
and Culture, and its impact on American culture, could it be that such an assumption of what
entails a “countercultural perspective” has been influenced by Niebuhr’s presentation of it?
When we as Americans hear that term, are we thinking of it in Niebuhr’s understanding? Are we
thinking of the “radicals” who disconnect themselves from social life? According to Niebuhr’s
presentation of being “countercultural” in Christ and Culture, whenever a Christian is labeled
“against culture,” or being “counter-cultural,” such descriptions undoubtedly carry assumed
understandings of what is or what is not implied. And they have arguably negative connotations.
While McBride does not address this particular question about Niebuhr, she nevertheless
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introduces a problem of interpreting Bonhoeffer’s usage of the world and understanding his
concept of culture that seem to be reflective of the many ways that Niebuhr described those who
he claimed were “against culture.”
For example, in her essay addressing Bonhoeffer’s usage of the world in Discipleship,
McBride presents the primary interpretative difficulty of the book as the following:
For some Christians in the United States . . . feeling rejected by the world is a badge
of Christian honor. Read out of context, Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on rejection may
serve to reinforce a victim mentality present within some segments of North
American Christianity that promotes a belief that in our democratic society Christian
identity alone necessarily positions Christians as rejected, even persecuted, by the
surrounding “secular” culture . . . Certainly, one may find statements in Discipleship
that discourage an antagonistic stance against the world . . . Still, for a North
American audience that tends to view itself as religiously favored and to ground
witness in an assumption that Christians are called to be the disseminators of truth
and the standard-bearers of morality, Bonhoeffer’s language of Christian distinction
and worldly separation overpowers his few direct affirmations encouraging positive
this-worldly engagement. An ahistorical reading of The Cost of Discipleship does
little more than communicate a popular formula that Christians are in the world but
not of the world—a pithy saying that nevertheless risks neglecting the central
christological point that Christ and the church exist for the world . . . Bonhoeffer’s
message of separation from the world is subordinate to his message of responsible
engagement within the world. Bonhoeffer intends Discipleship to be read as God’s
word for his concrete moment, for he opens the preface by asking, “What does
[Jesus] want from us today?”178
Whatever one may mean when someone describes Discipleship as a work that is “against
culture,” “anti-culture,” or even “counter-cultural,” what is often overlooked within such
descriptions is McBride’s claim that “Bonhoeffer’s message of separation from the world is
subordinate to his message of responsible engagement within the world.”179 Context is certainly
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king, so what McBride’s essay does is to emphasize the necessity of reading Discipleship in its
own historical context.
In a similar fashion, scholars who have studied Bonhoeffer have argued that historical
context involves a wide range of influences, including the autobiographical, theological,
ecclesiastical, and political dimensions, among other factors. One influence should not be used
against the other.
Pertaining to the autobiographical nature of influence, there are also interpretations within
this perspective that seem to indicate that Bonhoeffer may have shifted—or even tweaked—his
thought throughout the years, thereby making allowance for scholars to interpret these shifts as
distinct phases. Bonhoeffer opens himself up to this kind of interpretation, as he alluded to it in
his letter to Bethge near the end of his life. So, an implication of that letter is that Bonhoeffer’s
thought in regard to relating Christ to culture also underwent some modifications throughout the
years.
Along these lines, Bonhoeffer’s perspective of relating Christ to culture in Discipleship—
or, in his terminology—relating the church to the world—has been argued to have shifted later in
Ethics. There his perspective is said to have shifted from Discipleship where he seemingly
indicated that the church and the world are within two separate realms to his view in Ethics
where he “vigorously argued against the theological scheme of two spheres.”180 The phrase, “two
spheres,” certainly brings various interpretations with it. Yet from McBride’s perspective, she
claims that even Bonhoeffer’s alleged theology of “two spheres” is much more complex than it
would seem on the surface. Part of its complexity is that in Bonhoeffer’s theology within
Discipleship of relating the church to the world, Bonhoeffer has a specific historical referent in
180
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mind. McBride claims that this “primary audience” of the book was specifically Bonhoeffer’s
students who lived with him at Finkenwalde. Rather than maintaining that the specific audience
was simply the “average” German Christian, McBride narrows the referent down further to the
students at Finkenwalde. They had a very unique situation, as they were:
. . . [E]ntering the Confessing Church’s resistance to Nazi ideology and rule, a
resistance defined institutionally by its refusal to incorporate into Reich church
government. The question concerning God’s will in the concrete moment is thus
inquiry into how Confessing Church members are to remain defiant towards Nazi
totalitarianism as faithful followers of Christ, especially since sustained and radical
resistance to the Nazi regime was rare even within the Confessing Church. The
“world” to which Bonhoeffer refers is primarily this context of totalitarianism and the
seductive powers of security and concession tempting Confessing Christians and
holding sway over the national church.181
Piecing together McBride’s argument has some valuable insight for our purposes. First, as
she previously indicated, Bonhoeffer’s usage of the world is completely misunderstood if one
interprets it from a purely American perspective that would otherwise coincide with the way in
which Niebuhr described the world as being equivalent to “secular society.”182 Second, and
closely related to this, is McBride’s observation that interpreting Bonhoeffer’s call to break from
the world should not be interpreted as Bonheoffer’s insistence to break from culture or society as
a whole, but instead, it is a call to break from a specific kind of culture. Such a break from this
world or this culture is not a physical escape but is a separation from being primarily identified
with one community to being primarily identified with another, but specifically, what Bonhoeffer
describes as a “new community.”183 It is a change in residence of identification. In other words,
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this break pertains to the source of one’s primary identity in that society where Bonhoeffer was
living.
To this extent, McBride claims that Bonhoeffer’s notion of break is not one “from the
world itself,” but instead, is one “from immediate or direct access to the world.”184 In order to
support this claim, McBride gives attention to the following comments made by Bonhoeffer in
Discipleship:
There is no genuine gratitude for nation, family, history, and nature without a deep
repentance that honors Christ alone above all these gifts. There is no genuine tie to
the given realities of the created world; there are no genuine responsibilities in the
world without recognition of the break, which already separates us from the world.
There is no genuine love for the world except the love with which God has loved the
world in Jesus Christ.185
For Bonhoeffer, the biblical patriarch Abraham is a model of what his notion of the break
entails. Like the disciples, Abraham also made a “visible” break from his former way of life as
he responded to God’s call. Abraham “receives the call as it is given.”186 Similar to the situation
of Bonhoeffer’s own time—or what he described as “today” —Abraham is not one to confuse
God’s calling with those “dissonant sounds, so many human, harsh laws, and so many false
hopes and consolations”187 like those Germans of Bonhoeffer’s time were encountering, as
Abraham “does not try to interpret [the calling], not does he spiritualize it.” Instead, Abraham
“takes God at God’s word and is prepared to obey.”188 Abraham, in turn, shuns any kind of
explanation that would otherwise influence him not to take the call of God seriously.
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Abraham did not allegorize or spiritualize the call, nor did he explain it away. He obeyed
the call “literally,” according to Bonhoeffer, and after his testing, Abraham was “permitted to go
back to live in the same world he had lived in before.”189 On the external level, “everything
remained the same,” except that “everything had to go through Christ.”190
For Bonhoeffer, then, as McBride points out, the break comes “not from the world itself,
but from immediate or direct access to the world.”191 In other words, the break is from engaging
the world apart from Christ.
To this extent, the break is not the goal. Neither is the goal simply to venture into the “new
community” that Bonhoeffer describes. Rather, as McBride indicates, Bonhoeffer argues that
Christ the mediator leads the church back into the world, so going back into it is the goal of the
break.
For Bonhoeffer, discipleship or nachfolge is, at its foundation, inseparably connected with
repentance. According to McBride, Bonhoeffer posits a paradox with this theme, as “Christians
turn away from the world in order that they may turn toward Christ the mediator, who then leads
them back into the midst of this-worldly reality.”192
Due to the complexity of interpreting every instance of how Bonhoeffer regards the world
in Discipleship, McBride admits that her interpretation does not end the discussion, since
Bonhoeffer uses the world in various ways repeatedly throughout Discipleship. Hers is merely a
guide to help readers and students of Bonhoeffer receive a general idea.
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Nevertheless, McBride’s perspective seems to avoid the extremes of completely jettisoning
autobiographical and historical contexts or becoming completely slavish by using context as a
transparency to interpret every instance of how Bonhoeffer describes the world in Discipleship.
Despite any nuances that may remain, however, McBride’s general thesis that “the ‘world’
to which Bonhoeffer refers is primarily this context of totalitarianism and the seductive powers
of security and concession tempting Confessing Christians and holding sway over the national
church” is narrow enough to help one to see that he has a certain kind of culture in mind in his
attempts of relating Christ to culture in Discipleship. This kind of culture is not “secular society,”
as Americans might tend to think. Culture, for Bonhoeffer, is that historically non-repeatable
power or influence of the Nazis that demanded ultimate allegiance from people. It was that
which could have never been accepted at any point in time for Bonhoeffer, nor could any
concessions be made to embrace it partially. In this sense, Bonhoeffer was completely against it,
whether it be from the Nazis or any other group that acted like them. But this certainly does not
suggest that he would have necessarily been against other cultures that existed in different
geographical locations during his own time. Instead, what is being emphasized is that Bonhoeffer
was completely against a particular kind of culture: the culture of Nazi totalitarianism.
Bonhoeffer and Christendom in Discipleship
Like the previous discussion of Bonhoeffer and culture, the discussion of how the topic of
Christendom unfolds within Discipleship is also a bit complex and also presents at least a couple
of interpretative challenges. As previously indicated, even though the word culture is absent
from Discipleship, its theme is nevertheless replete throughout its pages. The previous section
provided an argument that even though the word culture is not contained within Discipleship,
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thematic aspects of what is otherwise contained within the word are replete throughout the book.
Much of the same holds true for the topic of Christendom within Discipleship.
In regard to the word Christendom, it should be pointed out that it is absent from the
English translation of Discipleship. However, its lack of inclusion in the book is not an
indication that Bonhoeffer was not addressing thematic aspects of the word itself. As we will see,
Bonhoeffer was very much engaged with a certain understanding of this word.
Yet, there is difficulty with translation issues, as even though Christendom does not appear
in the English translation of the text, the German word Christenheit appears in a few places. In
English editions of Bonhoeffer’s writings, Christenheit is often translated as Christianity,
whereas in other instances, it even appears as Christendom. This discrepancy is the first problem
of the interpretative challenge.
The second interpretative challenge is similar. Rather than anachronistically importing
contemporary definitions of Christendom into the text of Discipleship, a much more responsible
method of interpretation seems to allow for Bonhoeffer himself to provide a definition of the
word, first from the text itself, and if it is not available there, then from his other writings.
Then again, even looking at the ways that Bonhoeffer used the word outside of
Discipleship is problematic, as it will be shown that he spoke of the term differently throughout
his writing career.
First, outside of Discipleship, one of the earliest references to Bonhoeffer’s usage of
Christendom comes from a sermon that he delivered in English in 1930 while he was in New
York. In the text, Bonhoeffer not only uses the English word Christendom, but he also provides a
precise definition of it:
If you ask me: What is Christendom? —I answer: Christendom is the great
congregation of people who humble themselves before God and who put all their
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hope and faith in the love and the help of God. Christendom is a community in which
people stand for each other, as a brother stands for his brother. Christendom is one
great people composed of persons of every country in concord in their faith and their
love because there is One God, One Lord, One Spirit, One hope. That is the
marvelous mystery of the people of God. Above all differences of race, nationality,
and custom there is an invisible community of the children of God. There each one
prays for the others, be he or she American or German or African; here each one
loves the others without reservation.193
According to John Anthony Moses, the elections of September 1930 that brought 107 Nazi
party members into the Reichstag convinced Bonhoeffer that war was on the horizon if the Nazis
continued to grow in popularity within Germany. As such, Moses writes, “the only way to avoid
this was to mobilize world opinion for peace by means of the ecumenical movement” and that
this was “Bonhoeffer’s all-consuming project until 1937.”194 Moses argues that the cultural
situation that was happening around the fall of 1930 “compelled” Bonhoeffer to concentrate
more on ecumenical issues, which contributed to the way that Bonhoeffer thought of
Christendom. Therefore, by taking that into consideration at this point in Bonhoeffer’s life, it
seems that he possessed a seemingly favorable perspective towards Christendom and its
possibilities for uniting Christians worldwide.
Three years before the sermon above was drafted, Bonhoeffer’s Sanctorum Communio was
published in 1927, and in it, Bonhoeffer also speaks favorably of Christendom. At one point, he
argues that Ernst Troeltsch provided a sociological “insight” (Erkenntnisse) into what the
English version translates as “Christianity.”195 In the German text, however, Bonhoeffer’s word
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for Christianity is Christentum. Troeltsch’s Social Teachings is then cited, and the part that
Bonhoeffer selects from it is that “repeatedly we are reminded that Christendom is a great
family.” In the German edition of the text, Christenheit is used in place of Troeltsch’s English
word of Christendom. The implication seems to be that Bonhoeffer is regarding Christentum and
Christenheit as synonymous terms, even though the translators of Sanctorum Communio
differentiate the two with the citation from Troeltsch.
Similarly, in Bonhoeffer’s address to the Fanø Conference in 1934, he speaks of
ecumenical Christendom to “call upon her Lord and ask his guidance.”196 While there is a
corresponding German translation of the text, what is particularly interesting about this address is
that the editors of the English edition indicate that it is “possible” that Bonhoeffer prepared the
English translation of it himself. As such, the German translation has Christenheit as well as
Bonhoeffer’s (presumably) own translation of it into English that renders that word as
Christendom.197 Consequently, the implication is that Bonhoeffer regards Christenheit and
Christendom to be synonymous terms, and he speaks of the concept again in a favorable way.
These instances are important to consider because Bonhoeffer’s earlier tendency of using
Christenheit and Christentum as interchangeable words seems to slightly shift later in his life.
While it does not appear that he ever juxtaposes Christenheit or Christendom with a
Kierkegaardian phrase such as “New Testament Christianity,” he does, however, seem to take a
more critical approach to Christenheit especially in his later years compared with the remarks he
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makes in his earlier writings. This discussion is important because Bonhoeffer had access to
Kierkegaard’s attacks where he juxtaposed “Christendom” with “New Testament Christianity.”
At any rate, Bonhoeffer introduces a rather discreet modification in his terminology that
becomes evident in an essay that he wrote in 1939 titled “Essay about Protestantism in the
United States.”198 Here, Bonhoeffer provides his own admittedly European-based interpretation
of how Christentum has unfolded throughout the centuries in the United States. In several places
throughout the essay, he juxtaposes the “churches of the Reformation” with the “denominations
in America,” and begins his paper by stating that “American Christendom (Christenheit) has no
central organization, no common confession, no common ritual practices, no common church
history, no common ethical, social, or political principles.”199 On the other hand, the “churches of
the Reformation” exhibit many of these characteristics whereas the “denominations in America”
simply do not. Such a picture of what Bonhoeffer calls American Christenheit is remarkably
different than the ways that Christianity has been culturally manifested in Europe.
Granted, while Bonhoeffer presents sharp comparisons between what he describes as
American Christenheit and even American Christentum with the churches of the Reformation, he
does not juxtapose Christenheit with Christentum within this essay. As the editors of the volume
note, Bonhoeffer uses Christenheit (translated as Christendom in this essay) throughout the essay
in such a way as to refer to the larger unity of all Christians, or that grouping of believing people
that is transnational and transcultural. Conversely, when Bonhoeffer speaks of Christentum in
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this essay, the editors note that he “refers more to the belief or faith itself.”200 This is, therefore,
an indication that Bonhoeffer’s terminology has undergone a transition, and that he is aware of it,
even if it is remarkably slight.
As a result, when Bonhoeffer speaks of “American Christendom,” the predicate
“American” is functioning as a signal denoting a certain kind of cultural expression of the deeper
Christentum that provides the unifying foundation. That foundation is the same for both America
and Germany, as Bonhoeffer claims that the two have “the same word, the same commandment,
the same promise, the same office, [and] the same church-community (Gemeinde) of Jesus
Christ.”201 The decisive split between the two, however, is that American Protestantism lacks the
Reformation that was granted to the churches of the Reformation in Europe,202 and so,
Bonhoeffer concludes the essay by indicating that the “decisive task today”203 is the necessity of
conversation between the churches in American and Europe. While his essay is largely a
historical analysis of American Christenheit, at least part of his motivation for writing it seems to
relate Christentum to “today,” or, to relate Christ to culture.
At other times of Bonhoeffer’s life, he does juxtapose the broader Christentum with at least
two other words. In a 1933 letter to his grandmother, Bonhoeffer writes that the battle is between
“Germanismus oder Christentum” and 1934, he postulates the choice of being a “National
Socialist or [a] Christian” to Bishop Ammundsen.204 Based upon the extant writings of
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Bonhoeffer, he does not, however, seem to have ever juxtaposed Christenheit with Christentum
in the Kierkegaardian way.
Despite this absence, Larry Rasmussen suggests that Bonhoeffer continues to display
characteristics up to and throughout Ethics that indicate that he is still committed to working out
a theology for what Rasmussen describes as a “Christian civilization.” It is not until
Bonhoeffer’s Letters and Papers from Prison where he began to completely distance himself
from this perspective.205 Yet, despite Rasmussen’s analysis, Bonhoeffer provides a critique of
Christenheit in his Ethics that is beyond his earlier, much more favorable perspectives. To this
extent, Bonhoeffer describes “two grave misunderstandings” that are “found throughout the
entire history of Christendom (Christenheit),” claiming that:
The first misunderstanding considers Jesus Christ to be the founder of a new ethical
ideology that must be applied to the historical reality. The second misunderstanding
considers Jesus Christ only as the divine sanction of everything that exists. The first
case gives rise to an eternal conflict between the necessities of historical action and
the “ethic of Jesus.” In the second case, everything that exists is addressed without
any conflict as though it were Christian.206
Immediately after these remarks, Bonhoeffer claims that “sometimes an ‘ethic of Jesus’
appears that is detached from the faith in God’s becoming human in Christ and the reconciliation
of the world with God through Christ,” which, for Bonhoeffer, culminates in the ways that the
Sermon on the Mount has been interpreted throughout history. On one side of the spectrum,
according to Bonhoeffer, the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount lead either to “religious
enthusiasm and revolution” or they become privatized, with the result that the Sermon on the
205
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Mount becomes detached from “dealing with the historical world.” Such “platitudes,” as
Bonhoeffer describes them, are also those that “prevail throughout Christendom (Christenheit).”
Up to now, this survey on Bonhoeffer’s usage of Christentum and Christenheit reveals that
Bonhoeffer does not have a fixed definition of the way that he regarded the two words. If other
aspects of Bonhoeffer’s thought have been argued to have shifted throughout his career, this
broad survey seems to suggest that the ways that he addressed Christentum and Christenheit
should also be regarded as being within phases that arguably underwent transitions throughout
his writings, even though they are slight.
As far as the source material of Discipleship is concerned, it is important to note that
Bethge indicates that “entire sections of his lectures [at Finkenwalde] went straight into the
book.”207 Interestingly, there are further clues to help us in some of these notes that did not make
their way into Discipleship. At one point, Bonhoeffer makes the following claim:
. . . [I]n his own way Luther confirms Constantine’s covenant with the church. As a
result, a minimal ethic prevailed. Luther of course wanted a complete ethic for
everyone, not only for monastic order. Thus the existence of the Christian became the
existence of the citizen. The nature of the church vanished into the invisible realm.
But in this way the New Testament message was fundamentally misunderstood,
inner-worldliness became a principle.208
What is particularly striking is that Bonhoeffer indicates that dramatic changes occurred in
the history of Christianity following Constantine. According to Bonhoeffer, Constantine’s
“covenant with the church” produced a “minimal ethic” which presumably suggests that the
ethics of Jesus were accommodated to the culture, thereby granting them social acceptability. In
addition, there were further consequences that followed Constantine’s reign from Bonhoeffer’s
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perspective, including that being a citizen of a so-called Christian empire implied that individuals
living within it were assumed to be Christians. This meant that the visibility of the church faded,
which led to “the New Testament message” being “fundamentally misunderstood.” According to
Bonhoeffer, the essence of the Christian faith drastically changed after Constantine’s reign.
Bonhoeffer’s comments here are extremely helpful, especially for our purposes. Even
though he does not explicitly mention Christentum or Christenheit in this section, his description
of the changes that have supposedly existed ever since the reign of Constantine are those very
same changes which have become culturally manifested throughout the years. They are not
confined to theological abstractions, or limited to the life of rituals, but are those which have
affected society and the very heart of Christianity itself. To this extent, they are those changes
that diverted from “the New Testament message” and are those which had a significant impact
on the theme of Christ and culture. Based on these comments, it would seem that Bonhoeffer
included the theme of Constantianism in his writings.
That is to say, in his notes, Bonhoeffer’s comments indicate that the “covenant” that
Constantine made with the church not only changed what people believed, but that it also led to a
change in the various ways that people acted out those beliefs. For one, being a Christian and
being a citizen became interchangeable and coterminous, so there was no need for a Christian to
be distinguished from others within society in any way.
While these comments are, admittedly, not contained within Discipleship, they are part of
those very same notes that Bethge indicated were part of the collection that contributed to the
book. So, since our main objective of this section is to interpret the way that Bonhoeffer
presented Christendom in Discipleship, these comments can provide us with clues about what to
look for in the text.
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The first instance of either of the two words appears in the preface of Discipleship. There,
Bonhoeffer describes Christentum and simply claims that it means “following Jesus.”209 What is
particularly striking about this definition is that within the first two pages of the first chapter, part
of Bonhoeffer’s description of “cheap grace” involves living a kind of life where there is “no
difference between [the] Christian life and [the] worldly life,”210 so there is no “necessary
renunciation” of anything required, nor is following Jesus necessary. Such “grace” provides
comfort, but its consolation is misleading.
The implication is set forth already: where there is no discipleship, there is no genuine
Christentum. And this Christentum, for Bonhoeffer, is not simply an “idea” or a “myth,”211
either; this Christentum involves following the living Christ. His presence is a reality. As
Bonhoeffer writes, “Christianity (Christentum) without the living Jesus Christ remains
necessarily a Christianity without discipleship; and a Christianity without discipleship is always
a Christianity without Jesus Christ.”212 These comments, according to the editors of Discipleship,
owe their influence to Kierkegaard, as he similarly indicates that one of the qualities of
Christendom is that “discipleship . . . really provides the guarantee that Christianity does not
become poetry, mythology, and abstract idea.”213 We know that Bonhoeffer had this text from
Kierkegaard in his possession, and that he had made underlining marks on these words.214
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What is the significance of this? For one, not only does Bonhoeffer’s concept of
discipleship owe at least some of its influence to Kierkegaard, but so does his notion of
Christentum, since Bonhoeffer indicates that genuine Christentum involves discipleship, and
where there is no discipleship, there is no Christentum. Christianity is lost without discipleship.
This theme continues at other places throughout Discipleship. Nearly three chapters later,
in “Discipleship and the Cross,” Bonhoeffer returns to the theme of following Jesus. In this short
chapter, Bonhoeffer describes the necessity of suffering as part of discipleship, and that by
suffering for the sake of Jesus, his followers become participants in the crucifixion.215 To this
extent, the suffering that comes into the life of the disciple is not “suffering that stems from
natural existence,” or suffering that comes by surprise, but it is a suffering that “comes from
being Christian.”216 Of course, the theme of suffering was a necessary aspect of what
Kierkegaard regarded as “New Testament Christianity,” as not only does he combine the themes
of suffering and discipleship, but he does it in a way as to make them inseparable. According to
Kierkegaard:
What Christianity wants is . . . the following of Christ. What man does not want is
suffering, least of all the kind of suffering which is properly the Christian sort,
suffering at the hands of men. So he dispenses with “following,” and consequently
with suffering, the peculiarly Christian suffering . . .217
The editors do not indicate that this section of Discipleship has Kierkegaardian influence.
However, considering that Bonhoeffer had a version of Attack upon Christendom in his
possession,218 these two ways of describing Christianity are extremely similar even though they
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are also reflective of the theme of suffering found throughout the Gospels themselves. As for the
precise wording that Bonhoeffer uses, there is no way that he could have missed Kierkegaard’s
description if he had possession of the book and interacted with it as much as scholars claim he
did. Kierkegaard juxtaposes various themes of Christendom with “New Testament Christianity”
(or some descriptions like it) very frequently.
So, Bonhoeffer seems to echo Kierkegaard here, as Bonhoeffer describes suffering as the
“identifying mark” of the disciple and that those who “do not want to give their lives in suffering
and being rejected by people” are those who are not disciples.219
In addition, Bonhoeffer claims that there is a pseudo-Christian persona, or what he
describes as a Christianness when one rejects suffering as an essential condition of discipleship.
Christianness, in other words, is really not being “Christian” at all. Bonhoeffer claims that “A
Christianness (Christlichkeit) that no longer took discipleship seriously remade the gospel into
only the solace of cheap grace.”220 For Bonhoeffer in Discipleship, therefore, not only does
genuine Christentum not exist where there is no discipleship, but Christentum without
discipleship is related to those false prophets who are an otherwise fraudulent expression of what
amounts to being Christian. Likewise, Kierkegaard in his Attack upon Christendom describes the
“hypocrites” as those who “play Christianity” but who do not “suffer for the doctrine.”221
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Christianness (Christlichkeit) is false Christianity for Bonhoeffer, where the light does not
and cannot shine.222 It is elsewhere described as masquerading as a “cloak of innocence,” hidden
underneath a mask. It could even be a prophet or a preacher with convincing “appearances,
words, and deeds.”223 Bonhoeffer indicates that the counterfeit may not even know that he
himself is the one who is deceived. His self-deception is that deep and pervasive. But disciples of
Jesus have confidence, as Bonhoeffer claims that Jesus liberates his true disciples from such
fears of being deceived because their obedience to him will reveal the true status of their hearts.
If one thinks that the theme of obedience may yield “countless [interpretive] possibilities”
as Bonhoeffer claims, he maintains that such an individual should direct his attention to the
Sermon on the Mount, as there, “Jesus knows only one possibility: simply go and obey.”224 There
is no confusion. Disciples are called to take Jesus at his word. The Sermon on the Mount for
Bonhoeffer is not a mere “ideal,”225 but is simply meant to be acted upon in obedience.
As the editors of Discipleship note, the theme of obedience to Christ, which is one that is
inextricably bonded to the gift of faith, is the recurring theme throughout the book.226 Such an
observation resonates with the sparsely scattered instances of Christentum in Discipleship, as
nearly all of its appearances fall within discussions pertaining to obedience. Therefore, true
Christianity, according to Bonhoeffer, produces obedience, and obedience is a necessary
condition, otherwise one has possession of a pseudo-faith or “cheap grace.”
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While faith in Christ is assumed within Bonhoeffer’s notion of Christentum throughout
Discipleship, obedience to Christ is a necessary corollary, as it cannot be separated from it in
order for Christentum to truly be Christentum. Part of problem, again, as Bonhoeffer claims, is
that the majority of people within his culture are not listening to Jesus, but are, instead, becoming
entangled in the “dissonant sounds” that have “so many human, harsh laws.”227 On the other
hand, “when holy scripture speaks of following Jesus,” Bonhoeffer maintains, “it proclaims that
people are free from all human rules.”228 In Discipleship, Bonhoeffer juxtaposes what is
happening with all of the uncertainties of “today” with the very ancient, but living words of
Jesus.
The consequences of not taking the words of Jesus seriously are dire. According to
Bonhoeffer, consequences have already occurred throughout history:
The expansion of Christianity (Christentum) and the increasing secularization of the
church caused the awareness of costly grace to be gradually lost. The world was
Christianized; grace became common property of a Christian world (christenlichen
Welt). It could be had cheaply. But the Roman church did keep a remnant of that
original awareness. It was decisive that monasticism did not separate from the church
and that the church had the good sense to tolerate monasticism. Here, on the
boundary of the church, was the place where the awareness that grace is costly and
that grace includes discipleship was preserved. People left everything they had for the
sake of Christ and tried to follow Jesus’ strict commandments through daily exercise.
Monastic life thus became a living protest against the secularization of Christianity
(Verweltlichung des Christentum), against the cheapening of grace. But because the
church tolerated this protest and did not permit it to build up to a final explosion, the
church relativized it.229
Even though these comments appear early in Discipleship, they nevertheless spur
Bonhoeffer into a scathing critique of how an increasingly secularized Christentum
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accommodated itself to the world. The “costly grace” that Bonhoeffer spoke of became a grace
that eroded into a “principle,” which, for Bonhoeffer, is said to have become a “new law” that
“neither helps nor liberates” people.230 Bonhoeffer admits that surely people and the world itself
have “become Christian”231 under this kind of grace, but in order to have become this kind of
Christian, discipleship itself had to be forfeited. It became something else, something not
Christian. In other words, for Bonhoeffer, Christentum without nachfolge is really not
Christentum at all, even though this sort of cultural representation of Christentum without
nachfolge was the most common expression of Christentum throughout his culture.
It is precisely within this context that Bonhoeffer seems to have been remarkably
influenced by Kierkegaard. When Bonhoeffer argues that Luther left the monastery and went
back “to the world,” and that it was the “sharpest attack that had been launched on the world
since early Christianity,” his language has a Kierkegaardian echo to it as this “attack” that
Bonhoeffer describes is a “frontal assault (Angriff frontal).”232 As the editors of Discipleship
indicate, almost identical language is used by Kierkegaard when he spoke of Luther’s action as a
“direct attack (direkten Angriff)” where “Luther rescued ‘discipleship (nachfolge), the imitation
of Christ’ from a fantastic misunderstanding.”233 Kelly not only claims that Bonhoeffer was
dependent on Kierkegaard at this point, but offers an interpretation of it:
The unfortunate result of that “misunderstanding,” against which Bonhoeffer,
following Kierkegaard, inveighed was that the error proclaiming justification without
works was as corrupting as good works without the grace of justification. Christians
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are not called to slink into the shadows of the hiding places provided by the power
brokers of this world for those who dare not live as Christ intended.234
This seems to be Bonhoeffer’s point: when he speaks of Luther leaving the monastery, his
argument is that Luther was not liberated from following Jesus, but that his liberation came from
following Jesus in the world even though it was one that was very hostile to the original message
of Christentum.235 Consequently, in this initial section of Discipleship Bonhoeffer begins using
the world very frequently. While he is not specifically addressing Christenheit, his description of
the world involves descriptions where the “whole world has become ‘Christian’ under [cheap]
grace”236 which has that very peculiar Kierkegaardian ring where the very notion of a “Christian
world” is considered to be a complete absurdity to Kierkegaard.237 Bonhoeffer denounces the
very same notion, even though it is empirically the case. Europe itself was a “Christian” land.
But where was nachfolge? It was non-existent. And so, Christentum itself was an illusion.
It should be emphasized that Bonhoeffer does not explicitly denounce this cultural shift in
Kierkegaardian terminology by pejoratively describing it as Christenheit, but this negative
description of the transition away from the era of the New Testament into a state of corruption
has the Kierkegaardian theme of Christendom. As Elrod argues, Kierkegaard did not merely
regard Christendom as the state church, but described it as:
. . . [T]he modern liberal state which is legitimated and sanctioned by religion in the
form of the Danish church. Christendom is the fall of life from the high plane of
ethics to the aesthetic view of life, where pleasure is conceived of as the highest
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good. Christendom is the legitimating of the political pursuit of one’s private interests
devoid of ethical obligation to the other.238
If Elrod is correct, and Christendom had its own nuances for Kierkegaard, then this is not
an indication that it had the same meaning and nuances for Bonhoeffer. As I argued earlier,
Christenheit up to this point in Bonhoeffer’s life had a very positive tone as it usually seemed to
have fallen within the context of discussions pertaining to the unity of believers throughout the
world. Kierkegaard’s usage of Christendom, however, is described in terms of a negative cultural
manifestation of what “New Testament Christianity” plummeted into decades after its origin.
Kierkegaard, therefore, speaks of Christendom negatively. He does not speak of it with any favor
or optimism.
With Bonhoeffer, on the other hand, Christenheit is used in a very similar way to how he
understood it years earlier when he claimed that “Christendom is that great congregation of
people who humble themselves before God and who put all their hope and faith in the love and
help of God.” 239 This is evident near the end of Discipleship when Bonhoeffer mentions Luther
again, yet this time Bonhoeffer claims:
[Luther’s] return rather was meant as a protest and criticism of the secularization of
Christianity (Verweltlichung des Christentums) within the monastic life. By calling
Christians (Christenheit) back into the world, Luther in fact calls them to become
unworldly in the true sense. Luther’s call to return into the world always was a call to
become a part of the visible church-community (sichtbaren Gemeinde) of the
incarnate Lord.240
The same feel is captured when Bonhoeffer speaks of Christenheit a few pages later, but
there, he regards Christians and Christendom (Christenheit) as synonymous words. Specifically,
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the way that he does this is when he writes of “a world that has become entirely anti-Christian”
when:
In the end, Christians (Christen) are thus left with no other choices but to escape from
the world or to go to prison. But when they (Christenheit) have been deprived of their
last inch of space here on earth, the end will be near.241
Out of the few instances of Christenheit that appear throughout Discipleship, Bonhoeffer
describes the word quite unlike the way Kierkegaard spoke of it during his attacks. There are at
least a couple reasons for this perspective. First, Bonhoeffer does not juxtapose Christenheit with
“New Testament Christianity” in the manner that Kierkegaard did repeatedly. Secondly, out of
the few places where Christenheit appears in the book, Bonhoeffer simply uses it in the sense to
convey something like Christians. Due to the differences in terminology, one should not assume
that Bonhoeffer’s critiques of his culture amounted to the same kind of attacks that Kierkegaard
launched against the church in his day. So by itself, Bonhoeffer’s description of the words
Christenheit and Christentum does not have any similarities with Kierkegaard’s usage of
Christendom in his Attack upon Christendom.
However, if we think of the way that Kierkegaard regularly addresses Christendom in his
Attack upon Christendom, then the corollary of that seems to closely parallel Bonhoeffer’s notion
of the world. This is especially true where Bonhoeffer speaks of the necessity of a break from the
world.242 Kierkegaard wanted to break from Christendom; for Bonhoeffer, the break was from
the world. And for both of them, it was a point of no return.
Bonhoeffer’s predicament was in the midst of a particular culture—the world as he called
it—that had tremendous power and influence, one where the world was “totalitarianism and the
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seductive powers of security and concession tempting Confessing Christians and holding sway
over the national church,” as McBride indicated. But as I concluded in the previous section,
Bonhoeffer had a certain kind of referent involved with his usage of the world, and it may very
well be closely related to that kind of culture that Kierkegaard spoke of when he blasted
Christendom. It was a corrupt power. Yet Bonhoeffer seemed to have been much more optimistic
about the possibility of Christendom being redeemed, so his goal was a project of reformation,
not deconstruction, as in the case with Kierkegaard.
So far, it would seem that Bonhoeffer with his church and world distinction is incredibly
unique in his attempts of relating Christ to culture. Bonhoeffer can separate the world and the
church without blurring the distinctions between the two. At the same time, he can hold an
optimistic view about Christendom—or his unique culture—of being redeemed.
Bonhoeffer and Christology in Discipleship
In this final section, I will specifically lay out the ways that Bonhoeffer’s Christology of
presence contributes to his overall argument in Discipleship. The uniqueness of his Christology
forms the foundation as to how he relates Christ to his particular culture.
Before delving into Discipleship, however, I shall investigate some of Bonhoeffer’s final
reflections. As his life was coming to an end, he confided to Eberhard Bethge that he had been in
the midst of a continual struggle with a vexing question that had plagued him for years. He
included this sentiment in his letter to his friend:
What might surprise or perhaps even worry you would be my theological thoughts
and where they are leading, and here is where I really miss you very much. I don’t
know anyone else with whom I can talk about them and arrive at some clarity. What
keeps gnawing at me is the question, what is Christianity (Christentum), or who is
Christ actually for us today? The age when we could tell people that with words—
whether with theological or with pious words—is past, as is the age of inwardness
and of conscience, and that means the age of religion altogether. We are approaching
83

a completely religionless age; people as they are now simply cannot be religious
anymore. Even those who honestly describe themselves as “religious” aren’t really
practicing that at all; they presumably mean something quite different by
“religious.”243
Without a doubt, Bonhoeffer’s reference to “religionless Christianity” has been interpreted
in various ways throughout the years. However, roughly twenty years after Bonhoeffer wrote
these reflections, Bethge claimed that the “isolated use” of this famous phrase of Bonhoeffer’s
“obscures all that he wanted to tell us about the living God.”244 The significance of Bethge’s
comments function as a reminder for interpreters to look at Bonhoeffer within his historical
context, especially when one considers that there seems to be no shortage of ways that
interpreters have applied this concept of “religionless Christianity” to all sorts of theological
arguments in the past several decades.
For now, if I am able to bypass the reference to “religionless Christianity,” and instead
focus upon the question that Bonhoeffer raises, it seems that the question Bonhoeffer presents is
actually given in two parts: the first one is, “what is Christianity?” and the second is, “who is
Christ for us today?” As the letter indicates, these questions were regularly asked by him,
perhaps until the very last days of his life. Yet, they are also the kind of questions that
reverberate back into the previous years of his life, especially during the years that contributed to
Discipleship.
An example of this is that the theme of the first part of the question is specifically raised
by Bonhoeffer in Discipleship where he writes, “our church’s predicament is proving more and
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more clearly to be a question of how we are to live as Christians today.”245 Such a statement as
this indicates that Bonhoeffer does not ask his question apart from considering how Christianity
is to be applied to his cultural moment. Yet, even before this question was raised, Bonhoeffer
made it clear within the Preface that his concern for writing was not simply to probe into
abstractions about Christianity, but instead, he makes it clear that he is interested in applying
Christianity to “today” for such people as “the worker, the businessman, the famer, or the
solider.”246 In other words, Bonhoeffer is interested in the real-life application of “understanding
grace and discipleship.”247 Based upon his letter to Bethge years later, it seems to have been a
very personal question for Bonhoeffer, but the way that he applied it throughout Discipleship
made himself function as a representative for others. Bonhoeffer did not seem to think that he
was alone with his questions of relating Christ to culture.
Of course, the way that his answer to the enduring problem unfolds is complex, as much of
it directly pertains to how the church and individual Christians ought to express obedience to
Jesus. However, as I indicated in the previous section, the way that Bonhoeffer primarily
approached this big theme of relating Christianity to “today” in Discipleship was to link genuine
Christianity with discipleship. It could be said for Bonhoeffer that true Christianity entails
obedient discipleship. Without the former, the latter will not exist, and conversely, without the
latter, the former will not exist. Discipleship is necessary for Christianity to be Christianity.
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The second part of the question that Bonhoeffer asks in his letter to Bethge can also be
found in Discipleship. In fact, within the first words of the book, Bonhoeffer indicates that he
will be delving into the topic of “who is Christ for us today?” when he writes:
In times of church renewal holy scripture naturally becomes richer in content for us.
Behind the daily catchwords and battle cries needed in the Church Struggle, a more
intense, questioning search arises for the one who is our sole concern, for Jesus
himself. What did Jesus want to say to us? What does he want from us today? How
does he help us to be faithful Christians today? It is not ultimately important to us
what this or that church leader wants. Rather, we want to know what Jesus wants.248
As I have argued throughout this chapter, these initial questions that Bonhoeffer is asking
in Discipleship are those that directly pertain to relating Christ to culture. In addition, it should
be pointed out that since these questions speak of Christ, they are also questions that pertain to
Christology in some way or another. In short, Bonhoeffer’s initial questions provide clues that
Discipleship will not only focus upon what Niebuhr later identified as the “enduring problem,”
but that Bonhoeffer will also expand upon a very specific Christology, one that is inseparable to
the way he relates Christ to culture.
Not surprisingly, the topic of Christology was an important one for Bonhoeffer. In his 1933
Christology lectures, Stephen Plant argues that Bonhoeffer “realized both the centrality of Christ
in theology and of the person of Christ within the Christian life.”249 Out of the many themes
discussed by Bonhoeffer in those lectures, one of the major ones specifically pertained to relating
Christ to human sociality.250 For Bonhoeffer, this not only involved corporate human life but also
pertained to relationships between individual people residing in different communities.
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In the lectures, Bonhoeffer also presents Christ as one who is personally present today as
word, sacrament and church-community (Gemeinde).251 Not only does this three-fold presence of
Christ continue into Discipleship, but the basic theological foundations of how Christ relates to
human sociality also make their way into the book, especially in regard to how Bonhoeffer
speaks of the world.
Nevertheless, as important as these lectures were for his own theological and personal
development, Plant claims that they also provide a very important link to Bonhoeffer’s theology
of discipleship and relating the Christian faith to everyday life, themes that undoubtedly receive
much attention throughout Discipleship itself.252 While Bonhoeffer affirms the two natures of
Christ in these lectures, special attention is devoted to the weakness of Christ and its relevance to
human society.253 For example, after affirming the deity of Christ in these lectures, Bonhoeffer
claimed:
. . . [W]e may not speak of this divine being, nor of his omnipotence, nor his
omniscience; but we must speak of this weak man among sinners, of his manger and
his cross. If we are to deal with the deity of Jesus, we must speak of his weakness. In
christology, one looks at the whole historical man Jesus and says of him, that he is
God. One does not first look at human nature and then beyond it to a divine nature,
but one has to do with the one man Jesus Christ, who is wholly God . . . If we speak
of Jesus Christ as God, we may not say of him that he is the representative of an idea
of God, which possesses the characteristics of omniscience and omnipotence (there is
no such thing as this abstract divine nature!); rather, we must speak of his weakness,
his manger, his cross. This man is no abstract God.254
Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on the weakness of Christ in these lectures paves the way for what
would prove to be the operating Christology in Discipleship. Yet, the full deity of Christ is also
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present in Discipleship, a theme that can also be traced back to his lectures. According to
Bonhoeffer:
The starting point is the given: the human being Jesus is the Christ, is God. This “is”
cannot be deduced. It is the presupposition of all thought, and cannot be constructed
subsequently. After Chalcedon the question can no longer be “How are the distinct
natures and the one person to be thought?” but strictly: “Who is this person, of whom
it is testified that he is God?”255
In regard to these Christological comments, Green indicates that for Bonhoeffer, “no
abstract notion of God apart from God’s revelation in the human Jesus is permitted” and that “no
abstract idea of the humanity of Jesus apart from his unity with God is acceptable.”256
Bonhoeffer’s presentation of Christ in his 1933 lectures forms the foundation for the ways
that Christ is later applied to his concrete situation in Discipleship. Since full attention is given to
the topic of Christology in his lectures, these perspectives serve as a background to how he
speaks of Christ in Discipleship, since he does not lay out a systemized Christology in the book.
Comments about Christ, however, are replete throughout Discipleship, but even these are best
understood in light of previous statements that he made in his lectures.
To be specific, what Bonhoeffer does in Discipleship is ground his theology of discipleship
in a Christology of presence. The theme of discipleship and a Christology of presence are
inseparably connected throughout the book. Bethge brings out this point as he claims, “to be
called, to go, and to follow—this is a true Christology.”257 On the other hand, “to be called and
not to follow, but instead to work out a program for use in this or that situation—this is a false
Christology.” Bethge elaborates on these comments, claiming that such a false Christology:
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. . . [L]eaves Christ out in the cold as an occasional aid toward salvation. But the call
creates a new and full existence; it creates a new point of reference, and hence breaks
away from legalism. It does not create constitutions and decrees, but brings human
beings into relation with each other.258
This “true Christology,” according to Bethge, results in transformation. It is not one that is
confined to doctrine, nor is it one that does not have any effects on the way that Christians
appropriate their faith in society and treat other people. Christ is living and is just as powerful as
when he walked upon the earth. So, “true Christology” and discipleship are interconnected, but,
they are interconnected to the person of Christ, not merely to an idea.
As such, discipleship, for Bonhoeffer is “a commitment solely to the person of Jesus
Christ” that breaks through “all legalisms by the grace of him who calls.”259 It is important for
Bonhoeffer that he distances himself from any notions of presenting a “legalistic” form of
discipleship, even though he can still maintain that followers of Jesus are to prioritize his words,
especially those from the Sermon on the Mount. And those words of Jesus are simply to be
“obeyed” in their literal form.260
Because Jesus’ words are to be “obeyed” and taken seriously, they are to be actually
carried out by his followers within society. In this “simple obedience”261 Bonhoeffer considers
Jesus to be the absolute authority figure. This is especially seen in the second chapter of
Discipleship. Jesus is set forth there as not being merely a moral exemplar262 (even though Jesus
should be imitated), nor is Jesus reduced to merely providing people with an ethical vision for
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life.263 Jesus, instead, is a powerful authority figure who commands obedience, but unlike other
figures who may also command supreme loyalty, Jesus gives the grace to make obedience not
only possible, but actual.
To this extent, Green claims that the Christ of Discipleship is “an overwhelming power of
‘absolute authority’ who demands total submission to his commands and the complete
renunciation of any independent human will.”264 Of course, there is a “step” that is required to
begin on what Bonhoeffer calls the “road to faith,”265 but this first step is later spoken of as being
tantamount to a human action that is empowered by grace.266 Even the familiar theme of
obedience that Kelly describes as “Bonhoeffer’s salient theme throughout Discipleship”267 is one
that is also inseparably connected to his Christology, and is one that is made possible by grace.
“This call,” writes Bonhoeffer, “is his grace, which calls us out of death into the new life of
obedience.”268 This is because genuine Christianity can only be defined by following Jesus,
which means:
An idea about Christ, a doctrinal system, a general religious recognition of grace or
forgiveness of sins does not require discipleship. In truth, it even excludes
discipleship; it is inimical to it. One enters into a relationship with an idea by way of
knowledge, enthusiasm, perhaps even by carrying it out, but never by personal
obedient discipleship. Christianity without the living Jesus remains necessarily a
Christianity without discipleship; and a Christianity without discipleship is always a
Christianity without Jesus Christ. It is an idea, a myth. A Christianity in which there
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is only God the Father, but not Christ as a living Son actually cancels discipleship. In
that case there will be trust in God, but not discipleship.269
The “living Christ” that Bonhoeffer highlights here is the “absolute authority” figure that
may have been held in comparison to the counter-power of Nazi totalitarianism. According to
Green, within Bonhoeffer’s cultural milieu:
Hitler is the Antichrist, a false messiah whose power literally destroys humanity. The
Christ of the Confessing Church calls his community into radical, militant, and
uncompromising opposition to Hitler; obedience to Christ, in whom the old humanity
is crucified, gives the possibility of authentic humanity. There can be no question that
this theology of Christ [in Discipleship] as the true power and authority offered a way
of redemption to German society and posed the crucial spiritual issue of the time.
Furthermore, in view of the long and deep German social tradition of authority and
obedience, it spoke an indigenous language which confronted people with this
theological issue. The commanding Christ of the Sermon on the Mount, therefore,
had an appropriateness to the social context of Christian theology as well as a
liberating, personal significance for the theologian himself.270
Green’s comments about the historical context are helpful. Such a background as this one
resonates with our previous assessments of culture and of Christendom throughout Discipleship
because Bonhoeffer’s Christology cannot be divorced from his own personal narrative and his
cultural milieu any more than culture and Christendom could be separated from their historical
background. As far as the autobiographical aspects of Discipleship are concerned, they are
touched upon by what Green considers to be the “numerous statements throughout [that]
correspond intimately with what Bonhoeffer revealed of his early life.”271 This seems to imply
that part of Bonhoeffer’s solution to his own struggles was forging a connection between the
ancient faith and modern times. The result is that it was not entirely important for him to ask,
“Who was Jesus?” but rather, “Who is Jesus for us today?” Hence, his Christology not only
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informs the way that he perceives discipleship, but also bridges this gap from the past into the
concrete moment. The result is that for Bonhoeffer, one can actually follow Jesus and can be
obedient to his commands, even those given in the Sermon on the Mount. Living according to
Jesus’ literal words is not an impossibility, but is possible and can be made actual.
Adding to this perspective that Green provides, the call of Jesus and not Hitler has the
“authority to call and to demand obedience to his word.”272 Of course, Hitler is not mentioned by
name in Discipleship, but comments that call for ultimate allegiance to Christ in a social context
of competing authority figures can only be understood in this way. Who else was demanding
ultimate allegiance from people in Bonhoeffer’s midst? To this extent, obedience to Christ and
him alone is truly countercultural, as Christianity understood in this way is against the majority
of culture—at least the majority of the culture where Bonhoeffer resided.
So the Christians Bonhoeffer is speaking to during this time become “strangers in the
world.”273 Due to their obedience to Jesus, they become alienated from the pull of the totalitarian
regime. They become against that sort of culture. But this world, as I have shown, is to be
understood within the social context of “totalitarianism and the seductive powers of security and
concession tempting Confessing Christians and holding sway over the national church.” From
Bonhoeffer’s perspective, it is certainly possible to disassociate one’s main identity from this sort
of world while simultaneously living in the midst of it. Bonhoeffer, then, adds a new dimension
as to what it means to be “against culture.”
As much weight as Green assigns to Christ being the absolute authority in Discipleship, he
also notes that there exists a paradoxical relationship between this absolute authority and the
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weakness of Christ. As far as the weakness of Christ is concerned, it pertains to the traditional
Lutheran motifs of Christ’s condescension in the incarnation, in his sufferings, and in the cross
itself, all of which can be traced back to his 1933 lectures on Christology.
Yet, from Bonhoeffer’s perspective, discipleship does not take place in a vacuum, nor is it
simply affirming these doctrines cognitively, but occurs when people are living in the world,
despite all of the obstacles. It was in the world where Christians no longer became hidden, but
instead, became witnesses to Christ as a result of their obedience to his words. Yet discipleship,
in this sense, is in many ways antithetical to the world. Bonhoeffer writes:
Where the world despises other members of the Christian family, Christians will love
and serve them. If the world does violence to them, Christians will help them and
provide them with relief. Where the world subjects them to dishonor and insult,
Christians will sacrifice their own honor in exchange for their disgrace. Where the
world seeks gain, Christians will renounce it; where it exploits, they will let go;
where it oppresses, they will stoop down and lift up the oppressed. Where the world
denies justice, Christians will practice compassion; where it hides behind lies, they
will speak out for those who cannot speak, and testify for the truth. For the sake of
brothers or sisters—be they Jew or Greek, slave or free, strong or weak, of noble or
of common birth—Christians will renounce all community with the world, for they
serve the community of the body of Jesus Christ. Being a part of this community,
Christians cannot remain hidden from the world. They have been called out of the
world and follow Christ.274
To act in such a way is to be extraordinary as Bonhoeffer describes it.275 Not only may this
sense of being extraordinary have its origin in Kierkegaard,276 but it may also indicate something
fundamental about Bonhoeffer’s Christology throughout Discipleship. The “so many dissonant
sounds, so many human, harsh laws” that he spoke of initially in Discipleship were those
distractions that contributed to the non-existence of discipleship in Bonhoeffer’s cultural
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situation. So, rather than inquiring into another source of guidance other than in Jesus,
Bonhoeffer’s solution to this strictly doctrinal portrayal was to not only examine the very words
of Jesus, but to urge others to put them into practice, even though it meant that they would be
“strangers to the world.” The initial problem, according to Bonhoeffer, is that all of the sounds
and laws extinguished the absolute authority of Jesus in every sphere of human life, which made
discipleship—and Jesus himself—impossible.
But what is fundamental about Bonhoeffer’s Christology precisely stems from the
beginning of the book: the distractions about Jesus amount to abstractions about Jesus and so
become far removed from his “human form.” The Christological commitment of Discipleship
not only has its roots in his 1933 lectures, but his Christology also forms the foundation of how
Christians are to engage the world around them. Jesus is present in the here-and-now, and he
empowers his followers to live a life of obedience to his words. As a result, Christians are by
their very nature people who have been “transformed,” and this, in turn, shapes the way that they
interact with the world. They can truly be extraordinary. Living by Jesus’ words is a possibility.
And it is because underneath it all, Christ “has taken on human form,” so he:
. . . [B]ecame a human being like us. In his humanity and lowliness we recognize our
own form. He became like human beings, so that we would be like him. In Christ’s
incarnation all of humanity regains the dignity of being the image of God. Whoever
from now on attacks the least of the people attacks Christ, who took on human form
and who in himself has restored the image of God for all who bear a human
countenance . . . Inasmuch as we participate in Christ, the incarnate one, we also have
a part in all of humanity, which is borne by him. Since we know ourselves to be
accepted and borne within the humanity of Jesus, our new humanity now also
consists in bearing the troubles and the sins of all others. The incarnate one
transforms his disciples into brothers and sisters of all human beings.277
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The “transformation” that is spoken of here comes as a result of the real presence of Christ
through word, sacrament and being part of the church-community. It is “not an ideal,” nor is it
impossible. It is not something that human beings can aspire to attain by themselves, but it comes
as a gift from Christ.278 The “transformation” produces genuine change that not only makes
people “like Christ,”279 but makes them become fully and truly human because they are being
molded into Christ’s very image.280
Since the ultimate source of their strength comes through Christ,281 Christians are enabled
to bear the burdens of others, and so, paradoxically, they become weak and become Christ to one
another. For Bonhoeffer, this means that Christians should be willing to embrace suffering, even
if it comes through persecution. “We are to be like Christ,” writes Bonhoeffer, “because we have
already been shaped into the image of Christ.”282 He continues with this theme into the book’s
final words where the editors note that Bonhoeffer is interacting with Kierkegaard’s own
reflections on discipleship when he writes:
Only because we bear Christ’s image already can Christ be the “example” whom we
follow. Only because he himself already lives his true life in us can we “walk just as
he walked” (1 John 2:6), “act as he acted” (John 13:15), “love as he loved” (Eph. 5:2;
John 13:34; 15:12), “forgive as he forgave” (Col. 3:13), “have the same mind that
was in Jesus Christ” (Phil. 2:5), follow the example he left for us (1 Peter 2:21), and
lose our lives for the sake of our brothers and sisters, just as he lost his life for our
sake (1 John 3:16). Only because we already are made like him can we be “like
Christ.” Since we have been formed in the image of Christ, we can live following his
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example. On this basis, we are now actually able to do those deeds, and in the
simplicity of discipleship, to live life in the likeness of Christ.283
Bonhoeffer’s Christology fuels his most basic concept of understanding the relationship
between Christ and culture. In short, if Christians are going to have any impact in any culture,
Bonhoeffer argues throughout Discipleship that it is going to be as a result of following Jesus
and of imitating Jesus. At the same time, however, the ultimate goal itself is not to aim for some
kind of cultural change, but instead, the goal is to be in simple obedience to the one who lived a
life of simple obedience himself. As a result of these observations, Nichols is certainly correct
when he claims, “whenever we look into Bonhoeffer on living the Christian life, we are always
bumping into Bonhoeffer’s christology.”284
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CONCLUSION
Why does Bonhoeffer in Discipleship provide such a different outcome than Niebuhr in
relating Christ to culture? This question that I set out to answer took several pages to unfold. I
noted that in Discipleship, Bonhoeffer is dealing with similar themes and problems just like
Niebuhr wrestled with years later, but, as we saw, he had an entirely different interpretation and
outcome than Niebuhr especially in the three areas of culture, Christology and Christendom.
Niebuhr’s perspective on culture has various descriptions of it throughout Christ and
Culture. Despite the critical perspective on this issue and everything that they claimed was either
hidden or stated in his definitions, Niebuhr’s task was arguably challenging.
However, considering the time that Niebuhr was writing, he attempted to utilize as many
perspectives as possible to help him. Niebuhr seemed to take as many legitimate factors into
consideration as he could even though he was writing as a theologian. If anything can be said
critically, perhaps it can be stated that Niebuhr simply failed to take other views of culture into
consideration. Like many other American Protestants of his time, Niebuhr was looking and
thinking about the issue from a Western perspective, and this surely limited his understanding of
culture. Had he considered that other Christians throughout time and throughout the world were
not always in a privileged position like him, and that cultural context influences the priorities,
behaviors and the beliefs of people, perhaps he would have had a little more sensitivity towards
the topic.
Bonhoeffer, on the other hand, was keenly aware of his culture, perhaps just as much (or
maybe even more) than Niebuhr was of his. Yet Bonhoeffer’s goal was not the same as
Niebuhr’s goal. Bonhoeffer’s counter-cultural attitude was not to break from culture or society as
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a whole, but instead, his attitude was to encourage other German Christians to break from a
specific kind of culture. They could still be within culture as such, but their primary
identification with it would have been that of separation from it. Niebuhr simply does not seem
to provide this type of allowance for individuals or the church as a whole without marginalizing
at least some of them.
Culture, and by way of implication — all cultures — for Niebuhr, is seen as a positive
characteristic, whereas for Bonhoeffer, his culture was a usurpation of a former good thing that
went awry. Bonhoeffer’s concept of his culture, then, was negative. Perhaps Bonhoeffer’s
perspective would have been different if he was writing in another cultural setting and one that
was favorable towards his understanding of the faith. As it stands, however, Bonhoeffer was
writing in his concrete moment and had a particular referent in mind when he addressed the
theme of culture.
Like Niebuhr, Bonhoeffer’s views on Christology and Christendom seem to be similarly
dependent upon his outlook of his cultural situation. Since both of their cultural situations
differed, their outcomes also were quite unlike that of each other. For Niebuhr, the strenuous
commands of Jesus were an interference to American ecumenism, whereas for Bonhoeffer, the
strenuous commands of Jesus were used to unite the German Christians. With the former, the
commands caused divisions and fanaticism, whereas with the later, the commands led to
unification and devotion. Christendom may have been assumed by Niebuhr since it was in good
standing. For Bonhoeffer, however, Christendom was not only assumed but was thought of as
needing thoroughgoing reformation.
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Aside from these three issues of culture, Christology and Christendom, what else led
Niebuhr and Bonhoeffer to produce such different results with their outcomes? Part of the
answer pertains to the motivation that Niebuhr and Bonhoeffer had in mind as they set out to
answer the enduring problem of relating Christ to culture. On the one hand, Niebuhr’s selfproclaimed goal (whether it is to be accepted or not) was descriptive in nature as he did not
attempt to give readers “the Christian answer.”285 On the other hand, for Niebuhr’s critics, claims
such as these were not taken seriously, as critics accused him of hiding behind the veil of
epistemic humility. In order to promote Niebuhr’s actual agenda for writing the book, individuals
such as Yoder argued that “the real point of Niebuhr’s book is to argue against the radical
position.”286 Whether or not this is actually true may, perhaps, never be known. However, based
upon the popularity of Christ and Culture throughout the years, one can be assured that critics
will continue to debate the book’s themes and arguments into the future.
Despite the criticisms directed against Niebuhr, his goal of being descriptive by avoiding to
formulate “the Christian answer” may have been reflective of his cultural situation. Unlike that
of Bonhoeffer, Niebuhr was living in the midst of a country where nearly any kind of Christian
expression could be tolerated. In Christ and Culture, Niebuhr attempted to sift through the many
competing voices in his culture in order to show that “there are possibilities of reconciliation at
many points among the various positions.”287 When the surge of denominationalism following
World War II had reached its peak, Niebuhr looked across the American landscape and simply
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focused upon the themes that could further unite Christians rather than divide them. For Niebuhr,
there were various ways of understanding and appropriating Jesus Christ in such a situation.
Despite the critical response to Niebuhr, his perspective was to not only consider but to also
apply a plurality of perspectives to culture.
Bonhoeffer’s situation was quite different. Unlike Niebuhr, Bonhoeffer’s goal was
admittedly prescriptive in nature, as he attempted to give his readers “the Christian answer.” He
was not concerned with “what this or that church leader wants.”288 His goal was not a pluralistic
survey but an exclusive attempt to know “what Jesus wants.”289 For Bonhoeffer, the Sermon on
the Mount was to be used as a directive for Christians to live by in society. So the key
differences with Bonhoeffer is that he had a particular audience in mind, a clear vision of how to
respond to the enduring problem, and that he was addressing a specific culture. His was not a
generalization or an abstraction of what culture may or may have not meant. His was the specific
referent of the regime of Nazi tolitarianism. Bonhoeffer envisioned that something different
should mark the Christian community apart from everything else.
Compared to Niebuhr, Bonhoeffer was living within a particular culture where Christians
were becoming increasingly silenced by the state. If the beliefs and practices of Christians were
to be tolerated, then they had to receive prior approval from the Nazi government. Like Niebuhr,
there were certainly competing voices seeking to be heard, but when Bonhoeffer searched
through them, he did not hear Jesus Christ speaking. The churches were uniting under the Nazi
government, and so, when Bonhoeffer looked across the German landscape, he focused upon the
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themes that could differentiate the Confessing Church apart from the German Reich Church. For
Bonhoeffer, there was only one way of understanding and appropriating Jesus Christ in such a
situation.
Of course, Bonhoeffer acknowledges this exclusive answer to the problem of relating
Christ to culture from the beginning of Discipleship, as he poignantly asks his readers, “What did
Jesus want to say to us? What does he want from us today? How does he help us to be faithful
Christians today?”290 When he was asking those questions, he found out that he was not the only
one who had ever asked them, as he discovered that Kierkegaard was asking the same kind of
questions, but did so years before in a different time, and at a different place. In a sense,
therefore, Kierkegaard was functioning as Bonhoeffer’s key conversational partner.
Yet Bonhoeffer and Niebuhr were both reading Kierkegaard, and were both looking at his
Attack upon Christendom. Both, however, appropriated Kierkegaard’s thoughts in their own
unique ways. For Niebuhr, Kierkegaard was periphery; for Bonhoeffer, Kierkegaard was center.
As for Niebuhr, he was certainly aware that Kierkegaard had been seeking for a way to relate
Christ to culture in his own day. However, rather than focus upon those areas of Kierkegaard that
further contributed to the separatist way of thinking, Niebuhr interpreted Kierkegaard in such a
way that aligned him with one of the heroes of German culture, the mighty man Martin Luther
himself.
Bonhoeffer, however, focused upon Kierkegaard’s question about the nature of true
Christianity compared with the popular representations of it. Like Niebuhr, Bonhoeffer also
appealed to Luther, but the way that Bonhoeffer spoke of him challenged the prevailing
290
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perception of him. As far as Bonhoeffer’s influence of Kierkegaard is concerned, Bonhoeffer
saw how Kierkegaard not only stressed the importance of discipleship, but also how Kierkegaard
argued that without it, true Christianity ceased to exist. From Bonhoeffer’s perspective,
discipleship was not a work of cultural and religious deconstruction, but one of cultural and
religious reformation. By being committed to Jesus Christ and him alone, one’s primary
allegiance was directed towards him, and not the state. Like Kierkegaard, Bonhoeffer was not
looking to accommodate any kind of belief to popular representations of the faith, and so
Bonhoeffer appropriated Kierkegaard’s concept of discipleship into his own concrete movement.
But, since Bonhoeffer still had hopes that there could somehow be a truly “Christian
civilization,”291 he could not quite appropriate Kierkegaard’s contempt of Christendom because
by doing so, he would have eliminated the possibility of ever attaining this ideal. Bonhoeffer
sought for reformation, especially by urging Christians to be serious about the Sermon on the
Mount.
Rather than appropriate Kierkegaard’s notion of Christendom, Bonhoeffer’s influence of
Kierkegaard’s attacks involved the creation of a functional dualism between the church and his
concept of the world which allowed Bonhoeffer to accentuate the role of Christian obedience
within the realm of the church itself. Bonhoeffer’s focus, at this time, was to call for a separation
between the church and his concept of the world. Someone such as Hitler could be regarded as
one who wrongfully usurped his authority.292 Rather than retaliate against someone like Hitler,
Christians are to act in obedience to their Lord by obeying the authorities, “not in order to gain
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some advantage,”293 but simply for the sake of Jesus and his call upon people. To this extent, the
seemingly forgotten words of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount are emphasized by Bonhoeffer
in order to differentiate the church and to make it visible apart from the prevailing notions that
accommodated to culture that rejected not only discipleship, but ultimately, Christ himself.
Whatever one thinks about how Niebuhr regarded the Sermon on the Mount within Christ
and Culture, what must be pointed out is that it was functionally useless for Niebuhr in offering
any guidance to the real world. From a Reformed perspective such as his, the Jesus within the
Sermon on the Mount did not have anything to contribute to a modern, American world such as
the one that Niebuhr and others like him were living in. Jesus is certainly there for Niebuhr, but
his Jesus is detached as an other-worldly, uninvolved figure who watches us from a distance.
In short, why did Bonhoeffer in Discipleship provide such a different outcome than
Niebuhr of relating Christ to culture? Perhaps it is simply that being “against culture” meant two
different things because the two individuals were coming from two different worlds.
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